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(m<E<FACE 
The interest in reliability theory currently exhibited by engineers ,mathematicians 
,economists .industrial managers and those concerned with the environmental and life 
iscience has stimulated the research work in this field . Reliability is barely three decades 
old concept ( primarily due to the complexity ) and is the result of an urgent need . 
Reliability means safety while unreliability causes scheduled delays, inconvicnce, 
customer dissatisfaction and loss of national security. The software reliability may be 
defined as the probability that given software operates failure free for a specified time on 
the machine for which it was designed, given that it was used within the design limits and 
that the last failure occurred at a given time. The issue of designing reliable software has 
acquired its importance due to the following reasons; 
> Systems are becoming software intensive. 
> Many software intensive systems are safety critical. 
> Software users are demanding reliable, warranted software systems. 
> The cost ofsoftware development is increasing 
This manuscript is intended to present a survey ,of available literature on " SOFTWARE 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS " .The work has been divided into five chapters with a 
comprehensive list of references at the end. The references are arranged chapter wise. 
The CHAPTER-1 entitled " RELIABILITY THEORY" deals with some concepts of 
reliability theory including the accelerated life testing . The failure models are discussed at 
length and are supported by various graphs to provide easy understanding of the concept. 
In CHAPTER-2 entitled " SOFTWARE RELIABILITY", the basic concepts in 
software reliability, the software development process and various models has been 
discussed. The NHPP software reliability growth models are discussed at length. 
The CHAPTER-3 entitled ''SOFTWARE COST MODELS AND 
ANALYSIS OF PREDICTIVE QUALITY" deals with the software cost models and 
gives the analysis of the prediction .Different methods of prediction are discussed .At the 
end of this chapter the reader would be able to answer the questions like ; 
u 
1. How should resources be scheduled to ensure the on-time and efficient delivery of a 
software product? 
2. Is the software product sufficiently reliable for release (e.g. have we done enough 
testing?) 
3. What information does a manager or software developer need to determine the release of 
isoftware from current software testing activities? 
The CHAPTER-4 entitled "OPTIMAL TIME INTERVALS FOR TESTING 
HYPOTHESES" discusses certain stochastic aspects of the software reliability problem. 
First an empirical stopping rule for debugging and testing computer software is discussed. 
Then some results are presented on choosing a time interval for testing the hypothesis that 
a software system contains no errors, given certain cost and risk constraints. 
The CHAPTER-5 entitled "OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TEST RESOURCES FOR 
SOFTWARE RELUBILITY GROWTH MODELING IN SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT " considers "software component testing resources allocation " for a 
system with single or multiple applications, each with pre-specified reliability 
requirements. The relation between failure rates of components and "cost to decrease this 
rate" is modeled by various types of reliability-growth curves. Closed-form solutions to 
the problem for systems with one single application are developed, and then "how to solve 
the multiple application problem using nonlinear programming techniques" are described. 
Also examined are the interactions between the system components, and inter-component 
failure dependencies are included in the modeling formula. In addition to regular systems, 
the technique is extended to address fault-tolerant systems. 
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RELIABILITY THEORY 
11 [NTRODUCTION 
It took man 2, 50,000 years to arrive at the agricultural revolution, 25,000 
years to arrive at industrial revolution and only 150 years to attain the space age and while 
we really do not know where we will go from here ,we know for certain that the coming 
age will involve the use of very large systems .Reliability is barely three decades old 
concept ( primarily due to the complexity ) and is the result of an urgent need . Reliability 
means safety while unreliability causes scheduled delays, inconvience, customer 
dissatisfaction and loss of national security. As for example a space satellite may be 
rendered as completely useless if a switch fails to operate. Reliability has been felt both by 
the government and industry .Although reliability has been defined in many ways but the 
most commonly used definition is given as ;[21] 
"Reliability is the probability of an item performing its intended function over a given 
period of time under the operating conditions encountered" 
Besides the above underlined four important aspects of reliability, these listed 
factors also affect reliability. [1] 
> Quality 
> Workmanship 
> Manufacturing process 
> Material 
> Storage 
> Handling 
> Engineering changes 
> Deviation in production 
> Inspection 
The measure of systems reliability is the frequency at which failures occur. Following are 
some causes of failures: 
* Deficiency in design 
* Deficiency in material 
* Deficiency in processing 
* Errors in assembling 
* Improper service conditions 
* Inadequate niaintenance[23] 
Classtfication of system: 
* System: Collection of equipments e.g. television. Equipment : Collection of 
components (without any other component) e.g. radio 
* Assembly: Collection of the components not at all as yet arranged e.g. terminal 
board. 
* Component: collection of elements arranged in order e.g. tube , resister 
* Element: which could not be further divided e.g. filament.[2] 
* Item: general term for all. 
About failures: 
A "failure " is an inability of a part or equipment to carry out its specified fiinction. 
An item can fail in many ways and these failures are classified as follows: 
(a) Depending on cause : 
I. Misuse failure: Failures attributable to the application of stresses beyond the stated 
capabilities of the item. 
II. Inherent weakness failure: Failures attributable to the weakness inherent in the item 
itself when subjected to stresses within stated capabilities of the item. 
(b) Depending on time: 
I. Sudden failures: Failures that could not be anticipated by prior examination. 
II. Gradual failures: Failures that could be anticipated by prior examinatiorL 
(c) Degrees of failures: 
I. Partial failure: Failures resulting from the deviations in characteristic beyond the 
specified limits not such as to cause complete lack of the required function. 
II. Complete failures: Failures resulting from the deviations in characteristic beyond 
the specified limits such as to cause complete lack of the required function, 
(d) Combination of failures: 
I. Catastrophic failures: Failures which are both complete and sudden. 
II. Degradation failures; Failures which are both gradual and partial.[23] 
1.2 Deriving Reliability Function: 
The probability that the random variable X takes on a value in the interval [a, b] is the area 
under the pdf from a to b, or 
r(a < X < b) -= f f{x)dx and f{x) > 0 for all x 
J a. 
In the terms of life data analysis, the above equation describes the probability of a failure 
occurring between two different points in time. However, this sort of information is 
required infrequently at best. What would be of greater interest would be the probability of 
a failure occurring before or after a certain time. If a were equal to zero, the above equation 
would return tlie probability of a failure occurring before time b. This introduces the 
concept of the cumulative distribution fijnction, or cdf. As the name implies, the cdf 
measures the cumulative probability of a failure occurring before a certain time. The 
equation for the cdf is given by: 
./ O, — o o 
Note that the value of the cdf always approaches 1 as time approaches infinity. This is 
because the area under the curve of the pdf is always equal to 1, and the cdf is essentially 
measuring the area under the pdf curve from zero to the point of interest. The following 
graphic shows the relationship between the pdf and the cdf [21] 
r(K) 
R«nctorn Var iab le >< 
/ ^ ( S J - ^ f X i a ) 
Looking at the definition of the cdf, it should be apparent that this function would have a 
direct application to life data analysis. This function returns the probability of a failure 
occurring before a certain time. Another useful function is the one that provides the 
probability of a failure occurring after a certain time. Note that the cdf measures the area 
under the pdf curve up to a given time, and that the area under the pdf curve is always 
equal to 1. Given these concepts, subtracting the cdf from 1 would resuh in the probability 
of a failure occurring after a given time. This is the widely-used reliability function. 
Accordingly, the cdf is also known as the unreliability function, and is represented by the 
function Q (T). 
Where R (t) is the reliability function. The reliability function can then be related to the pdf 
in the following manner: 
Q(t) + R(t) 
R(t) 
= 1 
R{t) = 
1 - Q(t) 
1- f f(3)d, 
/
oo 
f(s)d 
(Note that the gamma symbol that appears in the lower bound of some of the previous 
equations represents the location parameter that is found in some distributions. This is a 
parameter that effectively shifts the entire distribution by a value equal to the parameter 
value. This can be visualized as sliding the pdf curve along the x-axis of the plot.) 
The mean life, or MTTF, is another widely-used function that can be derived directly from 
the pdf The arithmetic mean or expected value is defined by: 
•CX3 
/^ = ?n f j S ' f(3)d3 
The reliability function R(t) is thus the probability of survival at time t and has the 
following properties; 
• 0 < Rit) < 1 
• R{0) = 1 and /?(oo) = 0 
• R(t) is in general decreasing fiinction of time. [ 1 ] 
R(t) 
Tim» (t) 
R (0 Vs time plot (Figure showing the typical reliability curve) 
The Reliability is often characterized by certain numerical quantities. The most important 
of these is the mean time to failure of failure free operation, which is defined as the 
mathematical expectation of the random variable T: [1] 
We have, 
E(T)=]tf(t).dt 
0 
= lim \tf{t).dt 
lim 
lim 
TF{T)-\F{T).dt 
0 
TF(T)-T + T-\FiT).dt 
0 
= lim[-^0-^(^))]+liml0-^(^))-^^ 
T^oc 
lim 
7->oo 
-T{\-F{T)) + \R{t)dt 
0 
00 
E{T) = \R{t)dt 
1.3 Failure rate / hazard rate concept: 
The rate at which failures occur in the interval t i to t 2 is called the failure rate It is 
expressed as the conditional probability that failures occur in the interval t 1 to 12 , given 
that failures have not occurred prior to 11 [2]i.e. the start of the interval. [3] 
Thus, 
I fi'lcU 
i(<) = CO 
{ti - h)\ f {t)dt 
\ f{t)dt - I f{t)dt 
h h 
( / , -t,)\f{t)dt 
'. 
If we substitute ti= t and ti = t + h, we get; 
R{t)-R{t + h) 
Ht)=- hR{t) 
We now introduce the hazard rate or instantaneous failure rate, which is defined as the 
limit of the failure rate as the interval length approaches zero. [2] 
A->0 
R{t)-R(t + h) 
. mo 
1 cIR it) 
R{t) dt 
R(t) 
> Relation between R(t) and Z(t): 
We have 
zm=/« dF{t) 1 
Integrating 0 to t. 
R{t) dt R{t) 
= [-log,(l-F(/)J 
Or 
= [-Iog,/?(Ot 
\Z{t)dt = - l o g ,R{t) 
Also, ° 
=> Rit) = exp -\z{t)dt 
F(/) = l-ex{j-jZ(/>// 
0 
t 
f{t)=Z(Oex^~jZ{t)dt 
0 
Three types of failure periods have been defined by British Standards Institution (BS.I); 
(I)Early failure period: (Infant failure period) 
That early period, starting at some time, during which the failure rate of some items is 
decreasing rapidly [1]. 
These failures can be eliminated by the so called 'debugging' or bum in 
process which is common in electronic industry. The concept of warranty is based on the 
concept of early failures After this phase there are till many failures left. [21] 
(Il)Chance failure period: chance failures occur during the actual use of the system (due 
the stresses). The phase during which only chance failures occur is called the usefiil life of 
the system. The failure rate is approximately uniform in this period. [3] 
(III) Wear-out failure period: That period during which the failure rate of some items is 
rapidly increasing. The wear out failures is caused due to aging or wearing out of 
components. These failures occur if the system is not maintained properiy .These failures 
can be arrested for some time but can not be eliminated completely. 
1 
• Early ure 
Wearout Life • 
Cfaihir* n t * inoraw** w/tima) • • / 
/ 
Useful ure 
(fMur* rai« apprax. oonnant) 
T i m * (hours, mfios, cyclos, etc.) 
An idealized reliability bathtub curve, with the three major life regions: early, useful 
and wear out [4] 
1.4 Statistical Failure Models : 
1.4.1 The Exponential failure law: 
The exponential distribution is commonly used for components or systems exhibiting a 
constant failure rate and is defined in its most general case by: 
fit) = Ae-^ (*-T) 
(Also known as the 2-parameter exponential in this form) with two parameters, namely^ 
andJ'. If the location parameter?', is assumed to be zero, the distribution then becomes the 
one parameter exponential, or, 
m - Ae •A* 
The Mean or MTTF 
The mean,7, or mean time to failure (MTTF) is given by: 
t • f{t)dt 
T 
. - A * 
= f t • X • e-^'^dt 
J -y 
1 
= y + — = 772 
A 
Note that when r= 0, the MTTF is the inverse of the exponential distribution's constant 
failure rate. This is only true for the exponential distribution. Most other distributions do 
not have a constant failure rate. Consequently, the inverse relationship between failure rate 
and MTTF does not hold for these other distributions. [4] 
The Median 
The median?' is: 
1 
r = 7 +--0.693 
A 
The Mode 
The mode ^  is: 
The Standard Deviation 
r -7 
1 
CTTP = —- = r 77Z 
The standard deviation^T is: A 
The Exponential Reliability Function 
The equation for the two-parameter exponential cumulative density function, cdf, is given 
by, 
F{T) - Q{T) = 1 - e-^^^^--^) 
Recalling that the reliability function of a distribution is simply one minus the cdf, the 
reliability function of the two-parameter exponential distribution is given by. 
10 
R{T) - 1 - Q{T) = 1 - / f{T)dT 
Jo 
r'^—y 
Jo The one-parameter exponential reliability function is given by, 
R(T) ^e.-^^ = e ~ -
The Exponential Conditional Reliability 
The exponential conditional reliability equation gives the reliability for a mission of t 
duration, having already successfully accumulated T hours of operation up to the start of 
this new mission. The exponential conditional reliability function is: 
Which says that the reliability for a mission oft duration undertaken after the component 
or equipment has already accumulated T hours of operation from age zero are only a 
function of the mission duration, and not a fiinction of the age at the beginning of the 
mission. This is referred to as the memory less property. [5] 
The Exponential Reliable Life 
The reliable life, or the mission duration for a desired reliability goal ^i?for the I-parameter 
exponential distribution is given by: 
ln[Ritn)] = -X(tR - T ) 
ln[it;(^^)] 
t^ = y A 
The Exponential Failure Rate Function 
The exponential failure rate function is given by: 
f{T) Xe~^^'^-y'> 
11 
Once again, note that the constant failure rate is a characteristic of the exponential 
distribution, and special cases of other distributions only. Most other distributions have 
failure rates that are functions of time. [6] 
Characteristics of the Exponential Distribution 
As mentioned before, the primary trait of the exponential distribution is that it is used for 
modeling the behavior of items with a constant failure rate. It has a fairly simple 
mathematical form, which makes it fairly easy to manipulate. Unfortimately, this fact also 
leads to the use of this model in situations where it is not appropriate. For example, it 
would not be appropriate to use the exponential distribution to model the reliability of an 
automobile. The constant failure rate of the exponential distribution would require the 
assumption that the automobile would be just as likely to experience a breakdown during 
the first mile as it would during the one hundred-thousandth mile. Clearly, this is not a 
valid assumption. However, some inexperienced practitioners of reliability engineering 
and life data analysis will overlook this fact, lured by the siren-call of the exponential 
distribution's relatively simple mathematical models. 
E f f e c t o f 7-^ or\ E x p o n e n t i a l pdf 
I t 
\ ?^o.oi 1 . ! : • • 
1 
! ; . . 
i 
1 7^0.005 \. - '. -
i")0 T'-IO Oi ' 
T i f 7 i e ( t ) 
D The exponential pdf has no shape parameter, as it has only one shape. 
D The exponential pdf is always convex, and is stretched to the right as >ldecr«ases m 
value. 
12 
D The value of the pdf function is always equal to the value of .lat T = 0 (or T =?'). 
D The location parameter, Y, if positive, shifts the beginning of the distribution by a 
distance of J'to the right of the origin, signifying that the chance failures start to occur 
only after Xhours of operation, and cannot occur before this time. 
1_ 
D The scale parameter \%X-f-Y=tCi-Y. 
D AsT-^f(T)->0. 
E f f e c t o f Y o n th ie E x p o n e n t i a l R e l i a b i l i t y F u n c t i o n 
I 
i : ;_ ;00 r i n 
D The one-parameter exponential reliability fimction starts at the value of 100% at T -
0, it decreases thereafter monotonically and is convex. 
D The two-parameter exponential reliability function remains at the value of 100% for 
T = 0 up to T -Y, and decreases thereafter monotonically and is convex. 
3 AsT->(»,R(T->oo)--H). 
1^  
The reliability for a mission duration of T = m =>l, or of one MTTF duration, is always 
(jqual to 0.3679 or 36.79%. This means that the reliability for a mission which is as long 
as one MTTF is relatively low and is not recommended because only 36.8% of the 
13 
missions will be completed successfully. In other words, of the equipment undertaking 
such a mission only 36.8% will survive their mission. [7] 
1.4.2 The Weibull failure law: 
The Weibull distribution is a general-purpose reliability distribution used to model material 
strength, times-to-failure of electronic and mechanical components, equipment, or systems. 
In its most general case, the three-parameter Weibull pdf is defined by: 
with three parameters, namely P, 7, and Y, where P= shape parameter, 7^ scale parameter, 
and Y= location parameter.[3] 
If the location parameter Y\s assumed to be zero, the distribution then becomes the 2-
parameter Weibull, or. 
One additional form is the 1-parameter Weibull distribution which assumes that the 
location parameter Y\s zero, and the shape parameter is a known constant, OTP= constant = 
C, so, 
Weibull Statistical Properties 
The Mean or MTTF 
The mean, f (also called MTTF or MTBF by some authors) of the Weibull pdf is given by 
:(3) 
14 
Where T P is the gamma function evaluated at the value of P 
The gamma function is defined as, 
(n) = I 
Jo 
CX3 
X ^n— 1 Tin)  / e-'^x'^-^dx 
This function is provided within Weibull for calculating the values of r(n) at any value of 
n .For the two-parameter case, Eqn. (3) can be reduced to, [5] 
Note that some practitioners erroneously assume that 7is equal to the MTBF or MTTF. 
This is only true for the case of ;^ = 1 since r{\^^) = r(2) = 1. [8] 
The Median 
The median,T is given by; (4) 
f = 7 + ?7(ln2)i 
The Mode 
The mode, ^  is given by: (5) 
The Standard Deviation 
The standard deviation'^! is given by: 
•vnl*0 ^ T " == ^ 7 • A / r ( ^ -h L ) - r f ^ -h 1 2 
The WeibuU Reliability Function 
The equation for the three-parameter Weibull cumulative density function, cdf, is given by: 
15 
F(T) = l-e" T-7 
p 
Recalling that the reliability function of a distribution is simply one minus the cdf, the 
reliability function for the three-parameter Weibull distribution is given by, [9] 
R{T) T-' 
The Weibull Conditional Reliability Function 
The three-parameter Weibull conditional reliability function is given by :( 6) 
|9 
R{t\T) = R(T-{-t) e V ^ R{T) 
•n 
P 
R{t\T) - e 
i+i=iV_(i^V 
Equation (6) gives the reliability for a new mission of t duration, having already 
accumulated T hours of operation up to the start of this new mission, and the units are 
checked out to assure that they will start the next mission successfully. It is called 
conditional because you can calculate the reliability of a new mission based on the fact that 
the unit(s) akeady accumulated T hours of operation successfully. [10] 
The Weibull Reliable Life 
The reliable life,''i? of a unit for a specified reliability, starting the mission at age zero, is 
given by;(7) 
TR = 7 + ^ { - i n [ i e ( r H ) ] } i 
This is the life for which the unit will function successfully with a reliability of^v^i?). If 
0.50 then -Gf^f, the median life, or the life by which half of the units will survive. 
The Weibull Failure Rate Function 
The Weibull failure rate function, X{1), is given by: 
16 
X(T) ^ fiT) _ 13 fT -y^P--" 
Characteristic Effects of the Shape Parameter, /? 
The Weibull shape parameter,^ is also known as the slope. This is because the value of/^is 
equal to the slope of the regressed line in a probability plot. Different values of the shape 
parameter can have marked effects on the behavior of the distribution. In fact, some values 
of the shape parameter will cause the distribution equations to reduce to those of other 
distributions. For example, when P= 1, the pdf of the three-parameter Weibull reduces to 
that of the two-parameter exponential distribution or, 
1 T - T 
/ ( T ) = -e- n 
V 
Vk'here J3= X= failure rate. 
The parameter <^ is a pure number, i.e. it is dimensioniess. 
The Effects of ^ on the pdf 
The figure below shows the effect of different values of the shape parameter, /?, on the 
shape of the pdf One can see that the shape of the pdf can take on a variety of forms 
based on the value of/^,[5] 
17 
Weibull pdfwlth 0<p<1. p=1, and p>1 
I I I I I II I 
p«0.5 
U,UU4iJ 
Fig. 1: The effect of the Weibull shape parameter on the pdf. 
¥oTO<fi<,l: 
a AsT->0(orn,f(T)->oo. 
a AsT-^,f(T)-K). 
• f (T) decreases monotonically and is convex as T increases beyond the value ofi^ . 
D The mode is non-existent. 
For /?> 1, it becomes the exponential distribution, as a special case, or 
D fl[T) = OatT = 0(orr). 
D f(T) increases as T -> * (the mode) and decreases thereafter. 
D For /?< 2.6 the Weibull pdf is positively skewed (has a right tail), for 2.6 < 0< 3.7 its 
coeificient of skewness approaches zero (no tail). Consequently, it may approximate 
the normal pdf, and for 0> 3.7 it is negatively skewed (left tail). 
The way the value of ;^ relates to the physical behavior of the items being modeled 
becomes more apparent when we observe how its different values affect the reliability and 
failure rate functions. Note that for j^= 0.999, f (0) =00, but for ;9= 1.001, f (0) = 0, This 
abrupt shift is what complicates MLE estimation when ;^ is close to one. [5] 
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The Effect of i^ on the cdf and Reliability Function 
Effect of Weibull Shape Parameter on Probability Plot 
ill 
10.0'J 
1 C'l'' 
Time, it) 
Fig. 2; Effect of ^on the cdf on a Weibull probability plotting paper with a fixed value o^ . 
Figure 2 shows the effect of the value of A)n the cdf, as manifested in the Weibull 
probability plot. It is easy to see why this parameter is sometimes referred to as the slope. 
Note that the models represented by the three lines all have the same value of^ . Figure 3 
shows the effects of these varied values of J^ on the reliability plot, which is a linear analog 
of the probability plot. [11] 
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W e i b u l l R e l i a b i l i t y P l o t w / 0 < p < 1 , ^ = 1 , (3> 1 
0.6': 
Fig. 3: The effect of values of ^ on the Weibull reliability plot. 
D R (T) decreases sharply and monotonically for 0 < J^ < 1, and is convex. 
n For ^= 1, R (T) decreases monotonically but less sharply than for 0 < ^< 1, and is 
convex. 
D For ^ > 1, R (T) decreases as T increases. As wear-out sets in, the curve goes through 
an inflection point and decreases sharply. 
The Effect of ^ on the Weibull Failure Rate Function 
The value of ^has a marked effect on the failure rate of the Weibull distribution and 
inferences can be drawn about a population's failure characteristics just by considering 
whether the value of/?is less than, equal to, or greater than one. 
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W e f b u l l F a i l u r e R a t e w / 0 < p < 1 . ( 3 = 1 , p > 1 
LI LI I HiJ 
O 160 
M fi i 4 r i 
! : 1 1 
• • \ - • : ; - - • : • : : / • • : ; : : : : 
• ! i : . 1 
i /p«3 
1 ^ = 0.6 / 
; 
. . . . 
' 
? L I L L O O 4 L ' L I . 0 L ' 
T i m e . ft) 
: ,L"J.LILl bL 'LLL lL i 
Fig. 6: The effect of/?on the Weibull failure rate function. 
As indicated by Figure 6, populations with 0< 1 exhibit a failure rate that decreases with 
time, populations with 0= 1 have a constant failure rate (consistent with the exponential 
distribution), and populations with 0> 1 have a failure rate that increases with time. All 
three life stages of the bathtub curve can be modeled with the Weibull distribution and 
varying values QS3. 
The Weibull failure rate for 0 < ^< 1 is unbounded at T = 0 (orT). 
The failure rate, -i(T), decreases thereafter monotonically and is convex, approaching the 
value of zero as T -^ ooor X(oo) = 0. This behavior makes it suitable for representing the 
failure rate of units exhibiting early-type failures, for which the failure rate of units 
exhibiting early-type failures, for which the failure rate decreases with age. When 
encountering such behavior in a manufactured product, it may be indicative of problems in 
the production process, inadequate bum-in, substandard parts and components, or 
problems with packaging and shipping. [12] 
For &- 1, UX) yields a constant value ow, or, 
A ( T ) = A 
V 
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This makes it suitable for representing the failure rate of chance-type failures and the 
useful life period failure rate of units. 
For 0> 1, MJ) increases as T increases and becomes suitable for representing the failure 
rate of units exhibiting wear-out type failures. For 1< /'< 2 the ^T) curve is concave, 
consequently the failure rate increases at a decreasing rate as T increases. 
For 0= 2, there emerges a straight line relationship between KJ) and T, starting at a value 
ofMJ) = 0 at T = y, and increasing thereafter with a slope of T. Consequently, the failure 
rate increases at a constant rate as T mcreases. Furthermore, if ^= 1 the slope becomes 
equal to 2, and when Y^ 0, MJ) becomes a straight line ^^ l^ich passes through the origin 
wth a slope of 2. Note that at 0= 2, the Weibull distribution equations reduce to that of the 
Raleigh distribution. [13] 
When ^ 2 the X(T) curve is convex, with its slope increasing as T increases. 
Consequently, the failure rate increases at an increasing rate as T increases indicating 
wear-out life. 
Characteristic Effects of the Scale Parameter, 7 
W e i t D u l l pxzff R i o t w i t h X / a r y i n g \ / a l u e s o f r j 
Fig 5: The effects of 7on the Weibull pdf for a common/?. 
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A change in the scale parameter 'Thas the same effect on the distribution as a change of 
Ihe abscissa scale. Increasing the value of Twhile holding ^constant has the effect of 
stretching out the pdf. Since the area imder a pdf curve is a constant value of one, the 
"peak" of the pdf curve will also decrease with the increase of 7, as indicated m Figure 5. 
• If 7is increased, while ^and ^are kept the same, the distribution gets stretched out 
to the right and its height decreases, while maintaining its shape and location. 
D If 7is decreased, while /^ and /are kept the same, the distribution gets pushed in 
towards the left (i.e. towards its beginning or towards 0 or / ) , and its height increases. 
D 7 has the same units as T, such as hours, miles, cycles, actuations, etc. 
Characteristic Effects of the Location Parameter, Y 
The location parameter,?' as the name implies, locates the distribution along the abscissa. 
Changing the value of Xhas the effect of "sliding" the distribution and its associated 
function either to the right (if r> 0) or to the lefl (if r< 0). 
E f f e c t o f L o c a t i o n p a r a m e t e r y o n W e i b u l l pctf 
Time , (t) 
Fig. 6: The effect of a positive location parameter,/ on the position of the Weibull pdf. 
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D When Y= 0 the distribution starts at T = 0, or at the origin. 
D If X> 0 the distribution starts at the location Yto the right of the origin. 
D If ?'< 0 the distribution starts at the location Tto the left of the origin. 
• y provides an estimate of the earliest time-to-failure of such units. 
D The life period 0 to + ris a failure free operating period of such units. 
• The parameter Yma.y assume all values and provides an estimate of the earliest time 
a failure may be observed. A negative ?'may indicate that failures have occurred prior 
to the beginning of the test, namely during production, in storage, in transit, during 
checkout prior to the start of a mission, or prior to actual use. 
D y has the same units as T, such as hours, miles, cycles, actuations, etc. 
1.4.3 Normal Failure law: 
The pdf of the normal distribution is given by, [14] 
f{T) = -=e A ^ x J 
f(T)>0,-oo< T< co,-oo< T<oo,aT >0 
Vv^ here, 
D /^  = mean of normal times-to-failure, (also noted as?"), 
D ^T = standard deviation of the times-to-failure. 
It is a two-parameter distribution with parameters P(OTT) and^T, i.e. the mean and the 
standard deviation, respectively. 
The Normal Mean, Median and Mode 
The normal mean or MTTF is actually one of the parameters of the distribution, usually 
denoted asM. Since the normal distribution is symmetrical, the median and the mode are 
always equal to the mean, M= T =T. 
The Normal Standard Deviation 
As with the mean, the standard deviation for the normal distribution is actually one of the 
parameters, usually denoted as'^^. 
The Normal Reliability Function 
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The reliability for a mission of time T for the normal distribution is determined by, 
C O CX3 
n(T)= ff(t)dt= f ^==e''^(^)dt. 
J J <TrV27r 
T T 
There is no closed-form solution for the normal reliability function. Solutions can be 
obtained via the use of standard normal tables. Since the application automatically solves 
for the reliability we will not discuss manual solution methods. For interested readers, full 
explanations can be found in the references. [15] 
The Normal Conditional Reliability Function 
The normal conditional reliability function is given by, 
dt 
J rjp o -xv27r 
Once again, the use of standard normal tables for the calculation of the normal 
conditional reliability is necessary, as there is no closed form solution. 
The Normal Reliable Life 
Since there is no closed-form solution for the normal reliability function, there will also 
be no closed-form solution for the normal reliable life. To determine the normal reliable 
life, one must solve, 
oo 
2 R{T)= f i-==e~KV) dt 
^ for T. 
The Normal Failure Rate Function 
The instantaneous normal failure rate is given by, 
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A(T) = fJT) R{T) 
ajry/2'rr 
/ : 
CO X ' 2 \ crrj, ) dt 
O'T 
Characteristics of tlie Normal Distribution 
Some of the specific characteristics of the normal distribution are the following 
D The normal pdf has a mean, T, which is equal to the median, f, and also equal to 
the mode, f ,oxT-f= f. This is because the normal distribution is symmetrical 
about its mean. 
Normal Probability Distribution Function 
T=T=T 
rr 
- • - \ 
T i m e (T) 
- X ^ 
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D The mean^ or the mean life or the MTTF, is also the location parameter of the 
normal pdf, as it locates the pdf along the abscissa. It can assume values of - oo< T'<()o 
[j The normal pdf has no shape parameter. This means that the normal pdf has only 
one shape, the bell shape, and this shape does not change. 
Effect of CT on Normal Distr ibution pdf 
I ' j 
I.-I 
I - . / I I I I I 'iJij 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 
T i m e , (t ,1 
1 3 0 0 0 150 0 0 
D The standard deviation,^! is the scale parameter of the normal pdf 
0 As °^rdecreases, the pdf gets pushed toward the mean, or it becomes 
narrower and taller. 
0 As "^fincreases, the pdf spreads out away from the mean, or it becomes 
broader and shallower. 
0 The standard deviation can assume values of 0 < T<oo-
o The greater the variability, the larger the value oi9T, and vice versa. 
0 The standard deviation is also the distance between the mean and the 
point of inflection of the pdf, on each side of the mean. The point of 
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inflection is that point of the pdf where the slope changes its value from a 
decreasing to an increasing one, or where the second derivative of the pdf 
has a value of zero. 
D The normal pdf starts at T = - oowith an f (T) = 0. As T increases, f (T) also 
increases, it goes through its point of inflection, and f (T) reaches its maximum value 
at T =7*. Thereafter, f (T) decreases, goes through its point of inflection, and assumes 
a value of f (T) = 0 at T = +00 
1.4.3'The Lognormal failure law: 
The lognormal distribution is commonly used for general reliability analysis, cycles to 
failure in fatigue, material strengths and loading variables in probabilistic design. 
When the natural logarithms of the times-to-failure are normally distributed, then we say 
that the data follow the lognormal distribution. 
The lognormal distribution is commonly used to model the lives of units whose failure 
modes are of a fatigue-stress nature. Since this includes most, if not all, mechanical 
systems, the lognormal distribution can have widespread application. Consequently, the 
lognormal distribution is a good companion to the Weibull distribution when attempting 
to model these types of units. 
As may be surmised by the name, the lognormal distribution has certain similarities to 
the normal distribution. A random variable is lognormally distributed if the logarithm of 
the random variable is normally distributed. Because of this, there are many mathematical 
similarities between the two distributions. For example, the mathematical reasoning for 
the construction of the probability plotting scales and the bias of parameter estimators is 
very similar for these two distributions. [12] 
The lognormal distribution is a two-parameter distribution with parameters -"'and'^r. The 
pdf for this distribution is given by, 
f{T') = -=e ^^"T-
Where T^ ln(T), where the T values are the times-to-failure, and 
;] ^ = mean of the natural logarithms of the times-to-feilure, and 
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D T = standard deviation of the natural logarithms of the times-to-failure. 
The lognormal pdf can be obtained, realizing that for equal probabilities under the normal 
and lognormal pdf s incremental areas should also be equal, or, 
/(T) dT = f{T') dT' 
Taking the derivative yields, 
dT' = — 
Substitution yields, (1) 
/(T) = i^ 
f{T) = - ^==e A '.- ) 
Where, 
f{T) >0,T> 0, - o o < /r' < oo, CT' > 0 
Lognormal Statistical Properties 
The Mean or MTTF 
The mean of the lognormal distribution,/^ is given by [16] :(2) 
The mean of the natural logarithms of the times-to-failure,/' in terms of 7'and ^^is given 
by: 
The Median 
The median of the lognormal distribution, 7* is given by [16] :( 15) 
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The Mode 
The mode of the lognormal distribution T is given by [1]; 
The Standard Deviation 
The standard deviation of the lognormal distribution'^2" is given by [16]: 
(3) 
The standard deviation of the natural logarithms of the times-to-failure,"^!' in terms of T 
and "^^is given by: 
crjr' f (# - 0 
The Lognormal Reliability Function 
The reliability for a mission of time T, starting at age 0, for the lognormal distribution is 
determined by: 
OO 
n(T) = J f(t). 
_.lft^ZJ^^^ 
T 
OO 
^(^) = I —=e~^v"^^; dt 
J (JT' V 27r 
T' 
As with the normal distribution, there is no closed-form solution for the lognormal 
reliability function. Solutions can be obtained via the use of standard normal tables. Since 
the application automatically solves for the reliability we will not discuss manual solution 
methods. 
The Lognormal Conditional Reliability Function 
The lognormal conditional reliability function is given by, 
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i?(t|T) = ^ ( ^ + * ) - - ^ - ( - + ' ) ^ — J 1 J 
J I 
Once again, the use of standard normal tables is necessary to solve this equation, as no 
closed-form solution exists. [15] 
The Lognormal Reliable Life 
As there is no closed-form solution for the lognormal reliability equation, no such closed-
form solution exists for the lognormal reliable life either. In order to determine this value, 
one must solve the equation, 
CO 2 
RT = f L=e~H^) ds 
ln(T) 
fori. 
The Lognormal Failure Rate Function 
The lognormal failure rate is given by, 
f \^) T-a-^>\/2'K 
-i(2^)^ 
e - - "or 
R{T) .CO 1 -hC-r^y,^ 
As with the reliability equations, standard normal tables will be required to solve for this 
fiinction. [11] 
Characteristics of the Lognormal Distribution 
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• The lognormal distribution is a distribution skewed to the right. 
D The pdf starts at zero, increases to its mode, and decreases thereafter. 
D The degree of skewness increases as '^rincreases, for a given/''. 
D For the same'^ JT, the pdfs skewness increases as /''increases. 
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• For ^rvalues significantly greater than 1, the pdf rises very sharply in the 
beginning, i.e. for very small values of T near zero, and essentially follows the 
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ordinate axis, peaks out early, and then decreases sharply like an exponential 
pdf or a Weibull pdf with 0 </?<!. 
D The parameter,^ (or the mean life, or the MTTF) in terms of the logarithm of 
the T's is also the scale parameter, and not the location parameter as in the case 
of the normal pdf 
D The parameter '^T\ or the standard deviation of the T's in terms of their 
logarithm or of their T, is also the shape parameter and not the scale parameter, 
as in the normal pdf, and assumes only positive values. [10] 
1.4.4 Generalized Gamma Failure law: 
The generalized gamma function is a three-parameter distribution. One version of the 
generalized gamma distribution uses the parameters k,^ and^. The pdf for this form of 
the generalized gamma distribution is given by, 
• ' • ' ' ' "mf^iy 
Where ^ 0 is a scale parameter, ^> 0 and k > 0 are shape parameters and r(x) is the 
gamma function of x, which is defined by, 
Vi.r)- / ^"^-^-(-'fh 
h 
With this version of the distribution, however, convergence problems arise which 
severely limit its usefulness. Even with data sets containing 200 or more data points, the 
MLE methods may fail to converge. Further adding to the confusion is the fact that 
distributions with widely different values of k,/^ and ^may appear almost identical 
.where, 
A -
' '^ '^' And, 
1 
V /A-
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Where - oo< A'< oo, cr> 0, and - oo< A< oo. 
While this makes the distribution converge much more easily in computations, it does not 
facilitate manual manipulation of the equation. The pdf of the re-parameterized 
distribution is given by, (5) 
fin ^ { <7-i P I 
1 
;• 1 
(' 
i!l'! 
(, t"T\2-••( 
i f A / O 
i f A - O 
Generalized Gamma Statistical Properties 
Generalized Gamma Reliability Function 
The reliability function for the generalized gamma distribution is given by, (6) 
Where, 
-./^J^^-l. , \ 1 17 j <L—^—1.^ \ i f A > 0 
/ * ' ! / ; ) < 1 .i> (i i i i i i=ii) 
• • ^ 
i r A - 0 
if A < 0 
'!>( ri 
v"i7r ./-:x^ 
•(L 
i'^d n (k; x) is the incomplete gamma function of k and x, which is given by, 
1 '-'' 
i ' / l / • • : • ' • ) - T T - s^-'e-'ds 
Where r(x) is the gamma fiinction of x. 
Generalized Gamma Failure Rate Function 
Failure rate function is given by. 
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A(/ ) /(O 
7?(0 
Generalized Gamma Reliable Life 
The reliable life,^ of a unit for a specified reliability, starting the mission at age zero, is 
given by, (7) 
^,.+^ki[A=r7Hl-/^.*)l i f A > 0 
Characteristics of the Generalized Gamma 
As mentioned previously, the generalized gamma distribution includes other distributions 
as special cases based on the values of the parameters. [9] 
F'l ol.'L^l-'ility Dt-ns i ty Funct ic-n 
1 ; I 1 • 
, I Uog n o r m a l , , 
• The Weibull distribution is a special case vi^ hen X- 1 and, 
1 (i — (T 
In this case the generalized distribution has the same behavior as the Weibull for cr 
> 1, a= 1, and or< 1 (o^  < 1, i^ = 1, and ; ^ 1 respectively) 
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Lj The exponential distribution is a special case when X=\ and a= 1. 
• The lognormal distribution is a special case when X= 0. 
n The gamma distribution is a special case when X=a-. 
By allowing Zto take negative values, the generalized gamma distribution can be further 
extended to include additional distributions as special cases. 
1.5 ACCELERATED LIFE TESTING : 
1.5.1 What is accelerated life test? 
The more reliable the device is, the more difficulty it is to measure its reliability. This is so 
because many years of testing under actual operating conditions would be required to 
obtain numerical measures of reliability .One approach to solving this predicament is the 
use accelerated life tests. 
Accelerated life tests will apply stress (es) at levels that exceed the stress level the product 
will encounter under norma) use conditions in order to accelerate the failure modes that 
would occur under use conditions. [16] 
(a) An overview of some common stress loading schemes and stress profiles used in 
accelerated life testing: 
(I)Stress is Time-Independent (Constant Stress) 
when the stress is time-independent; the stress applied to a sample of units does not vary 
with time. For example, if temperature is the stress type, each unit will be tested under the 
same accelerated temperature for the duration of the test. [8] 
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T i m e 
Constant Stress Profile 
(ii)Stress is Time-Dependent (Time-Varying Stress) 
V/hen the stress is time-dependent, the stress applied to a sample of units varies with time. 
For example, if temperature is the stress type, each unit may be tested at lOOK for 10 hours 
then increased to 150K for 10 hours then increased to 200K for 10 hours over the duration 
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of the test. Time-dependent stresses can be applied in a variety of ways, including step-
stress, ramp-stress etc. Some common stress profiles are shown next. 
w 
u> r^ 
Time 
Step-Stress Profile Ramp-Stress Profile 
^ 
£ 
CO y 
_ _ / ~ 
Time 
_y 
Time 
Progressive Stress Profile Completely Time-Dependent Stress 
(b) Data and Data Types 
The analysis of accelerated tests relies extensively on data. Specifically, analysis relies on 
life and stress data or times-to-failure data at a specific stress level. The accuracy of any 
prediction is directly proportional to the quality of and accuracy of the supplied data. Good 
data along with the appropriate distribution and life-stress model usually results in good 
predictions. Bad or insufficient data will always result in bad predictions. [7] 
For the purposes of this reference, we will separate data into two types based on the failure 
or success of the product. Failure data will be referred to as complete data and success data 
will be referred to as suspended (or right censored) data. In other words, we know that a 
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product failed after a certain time (complete data), or we know that it operated successfully 
up to a certain time (suspended or right censored data). Each type is explained next. [1] 
(ilComplete Data 
Most nonlife data, as well as some life data, are what we refer to as complete data. 
Complete data means that the value of each sample unit is observed (or known)]. For 
example, if we had to compute the average test score for a sample of 10 students, complete 
data would consist of the known score for each student. For products, known times-to-
failure (along with the stress level), comprise what is usually referred to as complete data. 
For example, if we tested five units and they all failed, we would then have complete 
information as to the time-to-failure for each unit in the sample. 
Complete Data 
Unit 1 
Unit 2 
Unit 3 
Unit 4 
U n i t s 
- X Failed 
- X Failed 
X Failed 
X Failed 
-XFa l l ed 
Tinne 
(ii)Censored Data 
It is also possible that some of the units have not yet failed when the life data are analyzed. 
This type of data is commonly called right censored data, or suspended data. Assume that 
we tested five units and three failed. In this scenario, our data set is composed of the times-
to-failure of the three units that failed (complete data) and the running time of the other 
two units that have not failed at the time the data are analyzed (suspended data). This is the 
most common censoring scheme and it is used extensively in the analysis of field data. [6] 
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Unit 1 
Unit 2 
U n i t s 
Unit 4 
Unit 5 
Data Witin Right Censoring (Suspensions) 
Sofnnln =5 
- • Running 
• X Failed 
— X Failed 
>• Running 
- X F ailed 
Time 
Grouped Data Analysis 
Data can also be entered into ALTA individually or into groups. Grouped data analysis is 
used for tests in which groups of units possess the same time-to-failure or in which groups 
of units were suspended at the same time. We highly recommend entering redundant data 
into groups. Grouped data speeds data entry by the user and significantly speeds up the 
calculations. [17] 
A Note about Data Classification 
Depending on the event that we want to measure, data type classification (i.e. complete or 
suspended) can be open to interpretation. For example, under certain circumstances, and 
depending on the question one wishes to answer, a specimen that has failed might be 
classified as suspended for analysis purposes. To illustrate this, consider the following 
times-to-failure data for a product that can fail due to modes A, B and C: 
Time-to-Failure, hr 
105 
125 
134 
167 
212 
345 
457 
541 
623 
Mode of Failure 
A 
B 
A 
C 
C 
A 
B 
C 
B 
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A Linear Itolatlonship An Exponvntial R»iartionship 
Fig. 3: Example of two simple life-stress relationships 
Even when a model is assumed (i.e. linear, exponential, etc.), the mapping possibilities are 
still infinite since they depend on the parameters of the chosen model or relationship. For 
example, a simple linear model would generate different mappings for each slope value 
t»ecause we can draw an infinite number of lines through a point. If we tested specimens of 
our product at two different stress levels, we could begin to fit the model to the data. 
Obviously, the more points we have, the better off we are in correctly mapping this 
piarticular point, or fitting the model to our data. [1] 
Fig. 4: Testing at two (or more) higher stress levels allows us to begin to fit the model. 
(I)) Analysis Method: 
The steps involved in performing an analysis on life data that has been collected fix)m 
atjcelerated life tests are described below; [19] 
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(1) Select a Life Distribution 
irhe first step in performing an accelerated life data analysis is to choose an appropriate life 
distribution. Although it is rarely appropriate, the exponential distribution, because of its 
simplicity, has in the past been widely used as the underlying life distribution. The Weibull 
£ind lognormal distributions, which reqxiire more involved calculations, are more 
appropriate for most uses. The underlying life distributions available in ALTA are 
presented in detail in the Life Distributions chapter of this reference. [21] 
(2) Select a Life-Stress Relationship 
After you have selected an underlying life distribution appropriate to your data, the second 
step is to select (or create) a model that describes a characteristic point or a life 
characteristic of the distribution fix)m one stress level to another. 
Fig. 7: Selecting a model. 
ITie life characteristic can be any life measure such as the mean, median, R(x), F(x), etc. 
This life characteristic is expressed as a function of stress. Depending on the assumed 
underiying life distribution, different life characteristic are considered. Typical life 
characteristics for some distributions are shown in the next table. [22] 
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Distribution 
Weibull 
Exponential 
Lognormal 
Parameters 
(3\v 
X 
T,o* 
Life Characteristic 
Scale parameter, T] 
Mean Life (1/A) 
Median, f 
•Usually assumed constant 
For example, when considering the Weibull distribution, the scale parameter,'? is chosen to 
be the life characteristic that is stress dependent, while Pis assumed to remain constant 
across different stress levels. A life-stress relationship is then assigned to 7.The common 
life-stress models are; [22] 
D Arrhenius Relationship 
Eyring Relationship 
Inverse Power Law Relationship 
Temperature-Humidity Relationship 
Temperature Non-Thermal Relationship 
D Multivariable Relationships: General Log-Linear and Proportional Hazards 
D Time-Varying Stress Models 
(3) Parameter Estimation 
Once you have selected an underlying life distribution and life-stress relationship model to 
fit your accelerated test data, the next step is to select a method by which to perform 
parameter estimation. Simply put, parameter estimation involves fitting a model to the data 
and solving for the parameters that describe that model. In our case, the model is a 
combination of the life distribution and the life-stress relationship (model). The task of 
parameter estimation can vary from trivial (with ample data, a single constant stress, a 
simple distribution and simple model) to impossible. Available methods for estimating the 
parameters of a model include the graphical method, the least squares method and the 
maximum likelihood estimation method [21] 
(4) Derive Reliability Information 
Once the parameters of the underlying life distribution and life-stress relationship have 
been estimated, a variety of reliability information about the product can be derived such 
as; [18] 
D Warranty time. 
A6 
• The instantaneous failure rate, which indicates the number of failures occurring per 
unit time. 
D The mean life which provides a measure of the average time of operation to failure. 
C B(X) life, which is the time by which X% of the units will fail. 
1.6 The common life-stress models 
D Arrhenius Relationship 
r Eyring Relationship 
L Inverse Power Law Relationship 
D Temperature-Humidity Relationship 
H Temperature Non-Thermal Relationship 
CI Multivariable Relationships: General Log-Linear and Proportional Hazards 
C Time-Varying Stress Models 
1.6.1 Arrhenius Relationship : 
(a) Arrhenius Relationship Introduction 
The Arrhenius life-stress model (or relationship) is probably the most common life-stress 
relationship utilized in accelerated life testing. It has been widely used when the stimulus 
or acceleration variable (or stress) is thermal (i.e. temperature). It is derived from the 
i^orhenius reaction rate equation proposed by the Swedish physical chemist Svandte 
Arrhenius in 1887, The Arrhenius reaction rate equation is given by: [22] 
E. 
R{T) = Ae-l^ 
Where, 
D j"? is the speed of reaction, 
D A is an unknown nonthermal constant, 
n -^ ^ is the activation energy [eV), 
i'i /^istheBoltzman'sconstant(8.617385 ' 10~^^r^"'^), and 
D T is the absolute temperature (Kelvin). 
The activation energy is the energy that a molecule must have to participate in the reaction. 
In other words, the activation energy is a measure of the effect that temperature has on the 
reaction. [16] 
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The Arrhenius life-stress model is formulated by assuming that life is proportional to the 
inverse reaction rate of the process, thus the Arrhenius life-stress relationship is given by: 
(1) 
L{V) Cev Where: 
D L represents a quantifiable life measure, such as mean life, characteristic life, 
median life, or B{x) life, etc. 
D V represents the stress level (formulated for temperature and temperature values in 
absolute units i.e. degrees Kelvin or degrees Rankine} 
• C is one of the model parameters to be determined, (C > 0). 
[] B is another model parameter to be determined. [ 15] 
seo 
Stress 
•4ao 
Fig. 1: Graphical look at the Arrhenius life>stress relationship (linear scale) for 
different life characteristics, assuming a WeibuU distribution. 
Since the ArAenius is a physics-based model derived for temperature dependence, it is 
sliongly recommended that the model be used for temperature accelerated tests. For the 
siune reason, temperature values must be in absolute units (Kelvin or Rankine), even 
though Eqn.(l) is unitless. [23] 
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The Arrhenius relationship can be linearized and plotted on a life vs. stress plot also called 
the Arrhenius plot. The relationship is linearized by taking the natural logarithm of both 
sidesinEqn. (l)or, (2) 
ln(L(V)) =:ln(0) + ~ 
Antienius Weibull Model 
.cP 
-.^ •^ ' 
' ^ ^ a 
Arm/Welt. 
Date 1 
— 10 
SO 
• 63.2 
323 
F=30 I S^O 
368 00 406.00 A2AOO 
Stress 
4.42 00 460 00 
Beta=4 2915.6260, B^lBei 61866632. C-=68.9&4&4050 
Fig. 2: Arrhenius plot for Weibull life distribution. 
Ill Eqn. (2) In (Q is the intercept of the line and B is the slope of the line. Note that the 
inverse of the stress, and not the stress, is the variable. In Figure 2, life is plotted versus 
stress and not versus the inverse stress. This is because Eqn. (2) was plotted on a reciprocal 
scale. On such a scale, the slope B appears to be negative even though it has a positive 
value. This is because B is actually the slope of the reciprocal of the stress and not the 
slope of the stress. The reciprocal of the stress is decreasing as stress is increasing (/ is 
decreasing as Fis increasing). The two different axes are shown in Figure 3. 
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Arftienius Weibull Model 
. ^ ^ ^ • ^ 3eB.O0 406.00 424.OO 442.00 460.CK) 
S t r e s s 
r:.i:«r/:'; ciixw-^in o no24A 0.0023^ o.ci022<^ 000217 
1 / S t r e s . s 
n<^ tn . - l S'fJI'••.ftl'fiO. B ' I f i f i l ft1rte«6.32, C = R f ! . 9 f t 4 8 4 0 5 0 
Fig. 3. An illustration of both reciprocal and non-reciprocal scales. 
The Arrhenius relationship is plotted on a reciprocal scale for practical reasons. 
ITie shaded areas shown in Figure 3 are the imposed pcifs at each test stress level. From 
such imposed pdjs one can see the range of the life at each test stress level, as well as the 
scatter in life. The next figure (Figure 4) illustrates a case in which there is a significant 
scatter in life at each of the test stress levels. [21] 
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Fig. 4: An example of scatter in life at each test stress level 
A Look at the Parameter B 
Depending on the application (and where the stress is exclusively thennal), the parameter 
if can be replaced by: 
H—ildL— ft^^tivalion energy _ activation energy 
~1<~~ Boltzman's constant~.S.623 X lO-'^eVK ^ 
Note that in this formulation, the activation energy must be known apriori. If the activation 
energy is known then there is only one model parameter remaining, C. Because in most 
real life situations this is rarely the case, all subsequent formulations will assume that this 
a<2tivation energy is unknown and treat B as one of the model parameters. As it can be seen 
in Eqn. (V), B has the same properties as the activation energy. In other words, 5 is a 
measure of the effect that the stress (i.e. temperature) has on the life. The larger the value 
of 5, the higher the dependency of the life on the specific stress (see Figure 5). Parameter 
B may also take negative values. In that case, life is increasing with increasing stress (see 
Figure 5). An example of this would be plasma filled bulbs, where low temperature is a 
higher stress on the bulbs than high temperature. [14] 
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Life vs Stress 
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Fig. 5: Behavior of the parameter B. 
(b) Acceleration Factor: 
Most practitioners use tlie term acceleration factor to refer to the ratio of the life (or 
{icceleration characteristic) between the use level and a higher test stress level or, [13] 
Ajr = iii^^^ 
•*-^ Accelerated 
For the Arrhenius model this factor is, 
LUSE A^ = 
B B 
^ACCGU 
— e 
lerated C e ^A g V;A 
Thus, if B is assumed to be icnown apriori (using an activation energy), the assumed 
aictivation energy alone dictates this acceleration factor! [1] 
(c) Parameter Estimation 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method 
ITie log-likelihood function for the exponential distribution is composed of two summation 
portions shown next. 
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i = l i = l 
Where; 
n ^e is the number of groups of exact times-to-failure data points. 
D "^ J is the number of times-to-failure in the \ time-to-failure data group. 
D i. is the failure rate parameter (unknown). 
D ^ is the exact failure time of the / group. 
n S is the number of groups of suspension data points [12]. 
^ j is the number of suspensions in the / group of suspension data points. D 
7" ih 
I is the running time of the i suspension data group. 
Substituting the Arrhenius-exponential model into the log-likelihood ftinction yields, 
(7) 
A: 
F. r . -^^T,' 
> ] JVi In 1 -
7 • e^i 
c . . ^ 
The solution (parameter estimates) will be found by solving for the parameters^, 
dA. dA. 
CSo that dB= 0 and dC= 0, where, 
1 ^"^ /" '7"'- \ 1 "^  
^B-
1.6.2 Eyring Relationship: 
(a) Eyring Relationship Introduction 
The Eyring model was formulated from quantum mechanics principles and is most often 
used when thermal stress (temperature) is the acceleration variable. However, the Eyring 
relationship is also often used for stress variables other than temperature, such as humidity. 
The relationship is given by: [11] 
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(1) 
Where, 
LiV) = ^e-(^-^) 
D L represents a quantifiable life measure, such mean life, characteristic life, median 
life, B(x) life, etc. 
D V represents the stress level (temperature values in absolute units, i.e. degrees 
Kelvin or degrees Rankine) 
D A is one of the model parameters to be determined, and, 
D B is another model parameter to be determined. 
Fig. 1: Graphical look at the Eyring relationship (linear scale)* at different life 
characteristics and with a Weibull life distribution. 
Tlie Eyring relationship is siroilar to the Arrhenius relationship. This similarity is more 
apparent if Eqn. (1) is revmtten in the following vray: 
L(V) l^-(^-f) 
V 
e ^  
V (2) 
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L{V) = --Const. ' ev 
The Arrhenius relationship is given by: 
L{V) C e v 
Comparing Eqn. (2) to the Arrhenius relationship, it can be seen that the only difference 
betAveen the two relationships is the ^ 'terra in Eqn. (2). In general, both relationships yield 
vei7 similar results. Like the Arrfienius, the Eyring relationship is plotted on a log-
reciprocal paper. [10] 
L(f.^ V s I.tiK^ss 
Fig. 2: Eyring relationship plotted on Arrhenius paper. 
(b) Eyring Acceleration Factor 
For the Eyring model the acceleration factor is given by: 
AF=- LusE 
LA ccelerated I 
V^ 
-iA-4-^A 
A. 
B 
VA Bfvf-T^ 
u 
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(c) Parameter Estimation 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method 
The complete exponential log-likelihood function of the Eyring model is composed of two 
summation portions, 
ln(i:) = A = y^AT-ln 
2-
Vi e A M.) V,J--^).T, 
-Y:N!-V,-ei^-^<) -T!, 
Wliere: 
D ^e is the number of groups of exact times-to-failure data points. 
D •'^ i is the number of times-to-failure in the / time-to-failure data group. 
D w is the stress level of the/ group. 
C A is the Eyring parameter (unknown, the first of two parameters to be estimated). 
L 5 is the second Eyring parameter (unknown, the second of two parameters to be 
estimated). 
n i^'is the exact failure time of the i group. 
D Sis the number of groups of suspension data points. 
D ^ j is the number of suspensions in the i group of suspension data points. 
T- th 
D ^i is the running time of the i suspension data group. 
^ A 
The solution (parameter estimates) will be found by solving for the parameters -^nd Bso 
dk dA. 
that dA= 0 and dB= 0 where: [2] 
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dA' 
dB 
F \ S 
i = l ^ •^ 1 = 1 
= E^ ^ 
i=l »=i 
1.6.3 Inverse Power Law Relationship 
(a) Inverse Power Law Relationship Introduction 
Tlie inverse power law (IPL) model (or relationship) is commonly used for non-thermal 
accelerated stresses and is given by: (1) 
V/here, [1] 
D L represents a quantifiable life measure, such as mean life, characteristic life, 
median life, JB(X) life, etc., 
D F represents the stress level, 
D /T is one of the model parameters to be determined, (/T > 0), and, 
D A'^  is another model parameter to be determined. 
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Fig. 1: The inverse power law relationship on linear scales at different life 
characteristics and with a Weibull life distribution. 
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The inverse power law spears as a straight line when plotted on a log-log paper. The 
equation of the line is given by: 
(2) 
l n ( L ) - \n{K)- nln{V) 
Plotting methods are widely used in estimating the parameters of the inverse power law 
relationship since obtaining K and « is as simple as finding the slope and the intercept on 
iEqn. (2). 
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Fig. 2: Graphical look at the IPL relationship (log-log scale) 
A Look at the Parameter n 
The parameter n in the inverse power relationship is a measure of the effect of the stress on 
the life. As the absolute value of « increases, the greater the effect of the stress. Negative 
values of n indicate an increasing life with increasing stress. An absolute value of n 
approaching zero indicates small effect of the stress on the life, vwth no efifect (constant life 
with stress) when « = 0. 
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Fig. 3: Life vs. stress for different values of n. 
(1)) IPL Acceleration Factor 
For the IPL model the acceleration factor is given by: 
LuSE A KV^ 
LA ccelerated ± KVX 
VA 
7X 
\^ /here, 
is the life at use stress level, 
D ^Accekrated is the life at the accelerated stress level, 
• ^ is the use stress level, 
And 
D M is the accelerated stress level. [23] 
(e) Parameter Estimation 
Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation 
Substituting the inverse power law model into the exponential log-likelihood equation 
yields, 
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i=i 
s 
Where: 
n ^e is the number of groups of exact times-to-failure data points. 
"'^ns the number of times-to-failure in the l time-to-failure data group. 
[j w is the stress level of the i group. 
• A!" is the IPL parameter (unknown, the first of two parameters to be estimated). 
• JV is the second IPL parameter (unknown, the second of two parameters to be 
estimated). 
D ^ is the exact failure time of the/ group. 
G 5' is the number of groups of suspension data points. 
L, ^^i is the number of suspensions in the I group of suspension data points. 
; Ms the running time of the i suspension data group. 
The solution (parameter estimates) will be found by solving for the parameters K, nso that 
dA dA 
dK^ 0 and d l - 0, where, [21] 
o>A " ^' 
i = l 
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Or, 
l/ar(m)=- 1 -l-Var{k)+[\n{V)f Var(n)-^^^Cov{K, n) 
K^ K 
The variances and covariance ofK and n are estimated from the Fisher Matrix (evaluated 
2dK,n) as follows, 
^/-Sw 
Var{K) Gov{K,n) 
Cov{n,K) Var{n) 
dKdn 
dndK dv? -i 
- 1 
6\ 

SOFTWARE RELIABILITY 
2.1 THE SOFTWARE CRISIS 
The society is increasingly dependent on complex digital systems. The revolutionary 
advancements in the computer technology have greatly influenced the production of large 
scale computer software systems and posed several challenges to the management of 
software crisis. The high development cost, delayed delivery, lack of systematic design 
techniques and unreliable software are the main symptoms of the software crisis. In the 
early seventies, the software engineering discipline emerged to establish and use sound 
engineering principles in order to economically obtain the software systems that are not 
only reliable but also work efficiently in the real machines, thus bringing the software 
development under the engineering umbrella. There exist a number of models describing 
the software development process commonly known as the life cycle models. [23] 
The earliest software development process model is called as the Waterfall model. It views 
the software process as the successive phases as follows; [22, 23] 
> Requirement Analysis 
(The system service constraints and goals are established) 
> Specification 
(The translation of requirements into precise description of the software systems are 
applied) 
> Design 
(The creation of the software system that is consistent with the specification and 
representing the ftinctions of each software system in a manner which may readily be 
transformed into one or more computer programs.) 
> Implementation and unit testing 
(The creation of the software system which implements the design. Unit testing 
involves that each unit meets its specifications) 
> System testing 
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(The individual programs are integrated and tested to determine whether the 
implementation satisfies the requirements) 
> Maintenance 
(Involves the correction of the faults which were not discovered during the previous 
stages and enhance the performance of the software systems. 
Figure: WATERFALL MODEL 
Merits Of Waterfall model: 
> Each phase must be completed before the next starts. 
> Original model did not allow iteration. 
> Still most widely used in industry and standards. [2,12,3] 
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Demerits of Waterfall model: 
> Does not support parallel activity. 
> No working software until very late. 
> Does not support reuse. 
> Does not maintain customer involvement. 
To overcome these drawbacks, many software development models have been proposed. 
These models will be discussed at length later in this chapter. 
2.2 SOFTWARE RELIABILITY AND ITS IMPORTENCE 
The Quality of the Software system has many attributes such as complexity 
maintainability, portability, usability, security, reliability, availability etc .The software 
reliability is the most dynamic quality attribute (metric) which can measure and predict the 
operational quality of the software system. [21,22,20] 
The software reliability may be defined as the probability that given software operates 
failure free for a specified time on the machine for which it was designed, given that it was 
used within the design limits and that the last failure occurred at a given time. 
The issue of designing reliable software has acquired its importance due to the following 
reasons; 
> Systems are becoming software intensive. 
> Many software intensive systems are safety critical. 
> Software users are demanding reliable, warranted software systems. 
> The cost of software development is increasing. 
Further the process control systems such as Nuclear power plant safety control 
systems. Air-traffic control systems and ballistic missile defense systems are embedded 
computer systems. They are characterized by severe reliability, performance and 
maintainability requirements .The reliability criterion is particular crucial since any 
failures can be catastrophic. Hence, the reliability of these systems must be accurately 
measured prior to actual use. [23] 
2.2.1 Terms used in software reliability: 
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Calendar time; Chronological time including time in which a computer may not 
be running. 
Clock time; Elapsed time from start end of a program execution including the 
wait time on a running computer. 
Debugging process; The process of analyzing the cause of the software failure 
Jocating the faulty part and implementing the necessary steps to remove the 
software fault.[l] 
Deterministic: possessing the property of having only one value at a given time. 
' Environment: The set of all possible input states with their associated 
probabilities of occurrence. 
Error: The hypothetical cause of the fault. 
Execution time; CPU time or time spent by the processor to execute the 
program. 
Failure; Departure of the program operation from its requirements. 
Fault: Defective, missing or extra instruction or the set of related instructions 
that is the cause of one or more actual or potential failure types. 
Homogeneous: possessing the characteristics that do not change with the time. 
Imperfect debugging: when the debugging process does not remove the cause 
of the fault/failure. 
Example of an error, failure and fault is; 
Error: (Designers mistake) Failure to distinguish signed and absolute value numbers in an 
algorithm. 
Failure; Probe went off course and was lost. 
Fault: The FORTRAN navigational code DOS 1=1.3 was written instead of DOS 1=1, S. 
2.2.2 Software testing: 
The above mentioned reasons share one implied factor, the risk effacing a failure when the 
software is delivered to the ends users and its consequent high cost .To minimize the risk 
of the software failure in the field, and the software is continuously verified and validated 
through each stage of software development process. The objective of the software 
validation is to ensure that we are developing the right product, whereas the software 
verification ensues that we are developing the software right. 
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The only way to verify and validate the software is by testing .However, testing techniques 
can be categorized into two main techniques: [2], [3], and [16] 
> Top down techniques involves starting the test at the subsystem level. Then, the 
modules when comprise the sub system are tested. The procedure is recursively 
repeated until the test reaches the lowest level software component. 
> Down -top testing involves reversing the previous process. The software testing is 
destructive process as it aims at forcing the software to believe abnormally under 
some conditions. For this reason, the software programmers subconsciously avoid 
bringing their product into this stage. Therefore, it is preferred that the software is 
tested by an independent team. This testing method is called Independent 
Validation and Verification (IW), which means that the testing team is 
functionally independent from the development team and they test the software 
from the user's point of view This method, is also called Black box method. 
Generally, testing is the process of establishing the existence of the software faults 
The process of locating the faults and designating the procedures to remove them 
is called the debugging process.[15] 
> Coding and Logic Errors; 
Which include the performance errors, data errors, initialization errors, regenerated 
errors, etc? 
> Requirement errors; 
Such as misinterpretation of requirements ambiguous requirements, requirements 
change with new requirements. 
> Errors due to external in fluencies; Such as change in hardware or software 
environment, documentation error, etc. 
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2.3 Software reliability growth models : 
2.3.1 Introduction and Classification 
Previous studies have shown that around 38% of the faults detected are due to logic 
and design errors, while 32% of the faults are due to requirement errors. The process of 
fault removal { repair ) involves rewriting the code if the fauh is due to coding and 
design error or changing the requirements ( which require doing major repairs ) The 
chronology of failure occurrence and fault removals can be utilized to provide an 
estimate of the software reliability and the level of fault content. In this light, there is a 
need to develop a tool that can utilize this information to help the software engineers 
and managers in monitoring the progress of the testing. The Software Reliability Model 
(SRM) is the tool which can be used to evaluate the software quantitatively, provide 
development test status, schedule status and monitor the changes in the reliability 
performance. There have been many SRMs developed in the last two decades. Most of 
these models are based either on failure (fault) count or on the time between failures. 
Many of these models are estimators i.e. they are used during the software testing 
phase and are based on historical failure (fauh) data. A few models are predictive i.e. 
they provide the reliability of the software even before the coding phase being based on 
a particular metrics such as program length, complexity and others . The estimator 
SRMs are probabilistic model. They assume that the failure occurrence (fault removal) 
process is a non-deterministic process, though the cause of the software fault and the 
execution of the software are deterministic. Each of the SRMs is based on certainty 
hypothesis and assumptions. There have been many attempts to classify the SRMs 
according to various criteria. Some are classified on the basis of time domain category 
and the type of probabilistic failure distribution. Goal classified it into four categories, 
69 
namely, the time between failure models, error count models, error seeding models and 
input domain based models. The models are categorized into two main categories; 
1. The models which describe the dynamic aspects of failure occurrence process 
2. The models which do not consider the dynamic aspects of failure occurrence 
process, 
(1) The first category is divided into three sub categories; 
(i)Markovian models; 
The model is classified as Markovian model if the probabilistic failure process is 
represented by Markovian process. The software is represented by countable stages, 
each state corresponding to a failure (fault). The transition between the states depends 
on the current state of the software and the transition probability. The memory less 
property of the Markovian process implies that a time between failures follows an 
exponential distribution The earlier SRMs were based on Markovian process. Some of 
the models proposed in this category are; [2] 
Schick and Wolvertol modified JM model, Littlewood proposed a model based on semi 
markovian process to describe a module structure software .etc 
(ii).The Non-Homoeeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) models; 
This category includes the models which describe the Failure/ fault process by an 
NHPP, These models are also termed as fault counting models .The SRM is the mean 
value fiinction of NHPP. The model provides the expected number of failures / faults at 
a given time. This modele in this category will be discussed at length. 
(iii).Models based on Bavesian analysis; 
In the previous two categories, the unknown parameters of the models are 
estimated either by the least square method or by the maximum likelihood method. In 
this category of models Bayesian analysis is used to estimate the parameters. Based on 
the information, obtained from developing the similar software projects, the parameters 
of the models are assumed to follow certain distribution (known as the prior 
distribution).Given the software test data a posterior distribution can be obtained which 
in turn describes the failure /fault process. The first model in this category is the 
Littlewood and Verall model. 
(2) The second class is also further divided in to four sub categories. [23] 
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(i) The input domain models: 
The basic approach in this category is to generate a set of tests from a distribution. The 
distribution should be chosen so that it is the representative of the operation of the 
software and reliability is estimated from the outcome of the test cases .The Nelson 
model is the model in this category. 
(ii) Fault seeding models; 
In this class a known number of faults are introduced in the software. During the 
software testing both the seeded and unseeded models are found. Their proportion can 
give an estimate of the total fault count in the software the primer model in this class is 
due to the Ditto et al. 
(iii) Software metrics models; 
The models in this category relate the fault content in the software to some features of 
the software program such as program length, complexity etc. Lipow model falls in this 
category. 
(iv) Other static models; 
This category includes all the static models not included in the above three classes such 
as hypergeometric model by Tohma . 
There have been two trends in applying the SRGMs .The first is to adjust the 
testing environment to suit the models available, while the second is to analyze the 
testing environment and find the model that suits these environment .The main 
characters of the testing is the shape of the reliability curve. This shape is either 
exponential or S-shaped. The exponential shape indicates the uniform testing while the 
S-shaped indicates the lack of uniformity during the testing. 
In the real software development project, the non uniform testing is more 
popular and hence the S-shaped has been observed in many software development 
projects. The cause of S-shaped ness has been attributed to many reasons .Ohba and 
Yamada attributed it to the time delay between the fault removal and the initial failure 
observation which is the result of the unskilledness of the testing team at the eady 
stages of the test. 
Some of the unrealistic assumptions made are as, 
> All the faults are of the same type. 
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> The software faults are independent of each other, 
> The debugging process is perfect. 
> The imperfect debugging exists and its probability is constant during the 
testing. 
> The testing effort employed to detect and remove the faults has some 
consumption pattern. 
Some of the software reliability growth models are described below; 
2.3.2 Jelinski-Moranda Model 
The main hypotheses are the following: 
(1) The failures are detected independently from one another and in an aleatory manner; 
(2)The failure rate is the same between two consecutive faults; 
(3)The faults are corrected immediately after being detected; 
(4)The correction of one fault does not introduce another fault; 
(5)The rate of failure is proportional to the number of residual faults; 
The JM model assumes that ti,t2, , are independent random variables with exponential 
probability density functions 
And the failure rate is 
X^ = (iV-jL t 1 ) <i> 
Where N is initial number of faults and 0 is contribution of each fault to overall failure rate 
Notice that 
\.0X\ is treated purely deterministically. 
2. All faults have same size 0. 
3 The rate of the occurrence of failure is reduced by an amount 0 with every removal. 
Reliability function is: 
Rj it) = e ^'"^ i'i)<t>t 
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And the MTTF is: 
^ [ iv-_z.-Hj. j <i> 
The JM model assumes that (t k ,k-l...n} are the realizations of the random variables Tk 
with exponential probability density function 
where 
When our observation of the reliability growth (debugging) begins, the program contains 
N faults. Removal of a fault occurs whenever a failure occurs, and at each event the rate of 
occurrence of failures is reduced by an amount 0 Thus, 0 can be taken to represent the 
sizeofafauh. 
When {t k, k= 1 ,n } are the observed data, the current reliability is: 
The unknown parameters of the model, N and 0 are estimated by maximum likelihood 
CHAPTER - 2method 
For the series of "n" recorded faults the likelihood is: 
•4) 
and llirther (5) 
and the mathematical relation : 
m 
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N and 0 are estimated using the following derivative equations: 
• 1 r. / 
'•' • X - ' . •"''• 
f} In I^, ,. n , > 
- - :• • <-'- - - V^-rA- nix,, 
O) 
r-'C«- 1 / ' 
And using the notation N= a -1, we obtain: 
V ' . ... :" . . . 
•.vfi"i i|-..:' ; ! . • ; , i r i i ; : i o i . I 
V -:- N O i l . /V .'• >; 
With the restrictions: 
NGN, 0 >0, n <N 
There are 2 special cases for the estimation of the parameters: 
1. If the following inequality is satisfied: 
- V -• I (9l 
than the likelihood function is monotone increasing N ^00, 0-^0 and the ROCOF is X 
n/xn 
2 If the following inequality is satisfied: 
< - ! • 
iW) 
than the likelihood function is monotone decreasing, N =n and 0-nJyn 
With the estimated parameters we can calculate: 
and the median after "n ,, Debugging 
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hi 2 
The most serious criticism of this model is that it assumes the debugging process is purely 
deterministic and that all fauhs contribute equally to the unreliability of the program. 
2.3.3 Littlewood model: 
The main hypotheses are the following: 
1) At a failure, the fault is removed with certainty 
2) Faults manifest themselves at times that are independently exponentially 
distributed 
3) The rates of these faults come from r(a,B) distribution 
This mode!( Littlewood, 1981), is an attempt to answer the criticism of JM .The major 
drawback of JM is that it treats debugging as a deterministic process: each fix is effective 
with certainty and all fixes have the same effect on the reliability .In detail, the model 
assumes, as before 
V^here the random variable {Ak} represent the successive ROCOFs arising from the 
gradual elimination of faults. Here 
. ' • • * » . ' 
Where the initial number of faults and (pj is represents the (random variable) rate 
associated with fault j (in arbitrary labeling). 
The initial rates (pi, 92, ...., (p N are assumed to be independent, identically distributed 
gamma (a,13). 
U*3:) ::: W 
When the program has executed for a total time x, use of Bayes' theorem shows that the 
remaining rates are independent identically distributed gamma (a, 6+x) random variables. 
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,ff <!' \ the jhiih doe.': not occur in the period (0,.x) ~ 
fi ipjPr{;he fauit docs not occur in sh'i^period (0,x)[0 ^&,' 
\ F^i>Jf^r [rhc hndl do^'s no: occur in ilu: periodt'O..v j (t> - <? ,Ui.p 
(4) 
il':nim-ii 0!. !> jc'^' 
- ^i^nvYia' iU.h -x! 
\gamnuu a./) ) ^ ' ' ' dip 
This reflects our intuitive belief that the early fixes will tend to be associated with faults 
having larger rates; the initial average fauU size is a/j3, which becomes (a, B+x) for the 
faults remaining at time x. 
The ROCOF Ak after the testing period x and the discovering of (k-1) errors, is the sum of 
(N+K+1) i.d.d random variables, gamma (a, B+x). Than Ak is gamma ([N-k+l]a, [B+x]) 
with the mean 
!lA..i^ (N-k-r-l'iri (N-krl)c; (5) 
Under the condition the we have recorded k-1 faults in the interval 
(6) 
/-I 
For this stochastic process {N(x), x >0}, the mean numbers of discovered errors in the 
period [0, x]: 
fn{x)- EfNfs/J-N''Friths fauk occunm!mp€ri(paf9:x}f 
- A''/"/ Fr(:h^ fauhdo*'snoioccurintkiipenoi^O.^:;}] 
!' \fi<:)':'itnia,ijjc^(U -N I «• • 
!JfX I 
(7) 
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And the intensity functions: 
m 
For the exponential distribution of Tk and the gamma of Ak, using the total probability 
formula we can compute the probability density function which is Pareto : 
(!vbi)a>] •<P'x)Ajj 
- fH-k+Ite-(P-^ X J^ 
N-kTl)tt 
The current reliability is then; 
,(N-M i>ri I 
m 
Rk(tixk.i)-l-|fk{t|.x>:-i.)di^ 
v6+xk.i+-i^ 
and MTTF: 
(10) 
q.-Tki = |ti(tixi.;)di _ ;P+7«fe.i;^t. 
(N-k+^l;)a-13 m) 
which does exist under the condition: 
(N k - I)a •' 1 :> 0 
The median is: 
t ; iT] - (P i Xn) 
_Jn2 
J 
(12) 
(13) 
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IH) 
The restrictions for N, a, 6. are: 
Nizfi M>0 ,0>O M^n 
The ML 
and the equation s: 
• • + »» I ' • A l l I;. ; h'- • V< 
. « ' : > : . ^ . ^ , , ^ |5 - . : . < - . . . » • •^•--- : : : : „ „ ' 
(16) 
We can estimate a, from the first equation and the problem is reduced to a system of 2 
equations. Using the following parameters N, a, 6 we can estimate the following fijnctions: 
fn+l(t), Rn+l( t ) , Xn+l, h (x ) , ln+1. 
2.3.4 Littlewood- Verrall Model: 
The correction of fauhs is an double random process [21, 23, 14, and 12]. It is possible to 
remove a fault or to introduce a new one. The probability density functions between two 
consecutive failures it assumes: 
f{tjx^:-^-::-k:^-^i' «> 
The sequence of rates}.{is treated as a sequence of independent stochastically decreasing 
random variables. This reflects the likelihood, but not certainty, that a fix will be effective. 
It is assumed that the probability density distribution for X\, 
f { X . ) ~ — - J — ^ - ^ ~ ~ . ..:. "> 
"^  r ca ) 
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is gamma with parameters a, v|/(i). 
Note that-if: 
1) the function \|/(i) is increasing, the reliability is improved and, 
2) the function , \|/(i) is decreasing, the program is less reliable; 
debugging introduces supplementary faults 
The choice of parametric family for, \\i (i) is under the control of the user. Here we shall 
take 
The probability density function after seeing inter-failure times t i,t2,... tj-i is 
the current reliability 
R.(t) = 7 - - ± M - l ) _ v " 
and ROCOF 
A^( t ) -
.fc^-^:i|r^:(i:,:::i;| 
and the MTTFL 
a-/ 
( 5 ) 
t«J 
(71 
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The unknown parameters of the model, a, I3i, 13 2 are estimated by maximum likelihood 
method, the likelihood function being: 
<o> 
On observing n failures the likelihood function is: 
WM 
m mM^0*^ 
and the InL is: 
m 
By differentiating (10) w r .t. a, and equating to zero, yields: 
a n 
n 
Jr.. 1 
Cil) 
To remove the constraints we consider: 
i |r i -Pjfpj a«rf f2 -^ ,+«p2 (12) 
Where n is the current number Of total observed failures v|/ (k) can be expressed in terms of 
\|/1>0 and\|/2>0as: 
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By defining: 
n - l • n - l 
-^ iti -r-- nnti r . — llr^ -iK \*-^} X-^^^^~€: and x,-^ijr^"e 
We can now maximizejn the unconstrained x i and X2 space by substituting (13) into (10) 
with \|/i and \|/2 defined by (14) 
2.3.5 Keiller and Littlewood model 
KL is similar to L V, except that reliability growth is induced via the shape parameter of 
gamma distribution for the rates. That is, it makes assumptions with 
( A . ) - - ^ - -'-..^ ~ ^^ .. - — r-:i 
Here reliability growth, represented by stochastically decreasing rates (and thus 
stochastically increasing T's), occurs when V)/ (i) is a decreasing function of I. Again, 
choice of parametric form of \j/(i) is under user control. Here we shall use 
The probability distribution fiinction af^ er observing 11, t2, and ti.i is 
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the reliability function is 
D / ?-JX 
P v>Mi,«) 
ROCOF is: 
A,(t) = ^ - ^ , i ^ < : • ) 
and the MTTF is 
MTTF, = -
^ i | j ( i , a ) - ; 
The likelihood after n failures is; 
(6> 
^^ ^W^' (7) 
and the InL is: 
Here \|/ (k) is defined as (2) with 
And 
1 
ffj t^ fcOj 
^^ (10) 
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We define 
And 
ttj * i i a j 
a i + t t j 
Now \|/ (k) can be defined as: 
Substituting (13) into (8) gives 
» 1 
/n/. - nlny ^  *y ,ln p j ] -— 
* ^ • ^ i ' - — 
->'.E 7^-~—--EMP-/.) 
*^ " "* +v 1 1 1 *^ 
k-
By differentiating (14) w .r t. yi and equating to zero, we have. 
n 
k 1 ( )+y^( ) 
M-1 B ^ l 
Finally we define: 
ai) 
im 
(14) 
ln(l4) ^,5) 
j^ J=3»2 <^  ^''^ x ^ = p - e 0<») 
a 1, a2,13 can be obtained by substituting (15) into (14), this function 
is then maximized.over the unconstrained (x i, X2,) through definitions (16). 
2.3.6. Poisson model (time-related) 
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The main hypotheses are the following: 
> N(0) = 0 
> not more than one fault can occur in the time interval (t,t+dt); simultaneous 
events arc 'impossible' 
> the occurrence of an fault is independent of previous faults; the future is 
independent of the past 
> the rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF) is 
o'<:-.-5 c r t 
the occurrence of faults is described by the non-homogenous Poisson 
(NlliPP) distribution 
1 2 ) 
Where 
< 3 ) m(t) ~ iX ( s) ds 
m (t) is the mean (s-expected ) number of faults occurring in the interval (o,t) 
wit) = a ( 1 - e -^ )^ <*> 
Where a is the total number of faults and b is a constant. The number of faults remaining 
after time t, assuming that each fault which occurs is corrected without the introduction of 
others, is 
N{ t) = a e ^bt :.. , 
The reliability ftinction, after the most recent faults occurs and is corrected at time s, is 
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Ri t) - e ale ^^ e ^^^^ fc:)i <6) 
2.4 NHPP Software Reliability Models 
Notations 
> m(t) expected number of errors detected by timet 
("Mean value function") 
> a(t) error content function, i.e., total number of error in the 
Software including the initial and introduced errors at time t 
> b( t) error detection rate per error at time t 
> N(t) random variable representing the cumulative number of 
Software errors detected by time t 
> y(t) actual values of N (t) (Yi = y(ti)) 
> S j actual time at which the j ^  error is detected 
> R(£'t) reliability during (t, t+ 5] given that the last error occurred at time t 
2.4.1 Hyperexponential Growth Model 
The hyperexponential growth model (Ohba,1984) is based on the assumption that a 
program has a number of clusters of modules, each having a different initial number of 
errors and a different failure rate. Since the sum of exponential distributions becomes a 
hyperexponential distribution... the mean value function of the hyperexponential class 
NHPP model is: 
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rn(t)=i«J-r'^-'l; CD 
Where 
n = number of clusters of modules 
ai= number of initial faults in cluster i 
bi= failure rate of each fault in cluster i 
The failure intensity function can be obtained as follows: 
A similar extension of the exponential growth model has been suggested by Yamada and 
Osaki (1985) by dividing software into k modules. The expected number of faults detected 
for each module is exponential. Thus, the expected number of faults detected for the entire 
software can be obtained as: 
m ( i ) ^ a X p , ( l - e -' \ 
ay 
Where 
k = number of modules in the software 
bi = error detection rate of one fault within the ith module. 
Pi = probability of faults for the ith module 
a = expected number of software errors to be detected eventually or total number of faults 
existing in the software before testing. 
Type 1 Data: Interval Domain Data 
Assuming that the data are given for die cumulative number or detected errors yi in a given 
time-interval (0,ti) where i=l,2,...,n and 0<ti <t2<...<t n. 
For type 1 data, the MLEs of the parameters a and bj for i=l, 2, k can be obtained by 
solving the following equations simultaneously: 
86 
p, ( 1 - c ' • ) 
Type 2 Data: Time Domain Data 
Assuming that the data are given for the occurrence times of the failures or the times of 
successive failures, i.e., the realization of random variables Sj for j=l, 2, n. Given that the 
data provide n successive times of observed failures Si for 0 < Si <S2 < < s „ we can 
convert these data into the time between failures Xj where x; =Si -Sj.) for i=], 2,.,., n.. 
Similarly, for type 2 data, the MLEs of the parameters a and bi for i=l, 2, k can be obtained 
by solving the following equations: 
S P . O c - 0 '^ -^  
Yn^.e 
J 1 1 = ] : 
2.4.2 NHPP S-Shaped Model 
In the NHPP S-shaped model, the software reliability growth curve is an S-shaped curve 
which means that the curve crosses the exponential curve from below and the crossing 
occurs once and only once. The detection rate of faults, where the error detection rate 
changes with time, become the greatest at a certain time after testing begins, after which it 
decreases exponentially. In other words, some faults are covered by other faults at the 
beginning of the testing phase, and before these faults are actually removed, the covered 
faults remain undetected. Yamada (1984) also determined that the software testing process 
usually involves a learning process where testers become familiar with the software 
products, environments, and software specifications. Several S-shaped models (Yamada, 
1984; Pham, 1997) such as delayed S-shaped, infection S-shaped, etc., will also be 
discussed in this section. [2] 
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The NHPP S-shape model is based on the following assumptions: 
1. The error detection rate differs among faults. 
2. Each time a software failure occurs, the software error which caused it is immediately 
removed, and no new errors arc introduced. 
This can be shown as the following differential equations: 
—. ^ ^ b(t)La - m ( t v j , y^ 
Where 
a =^  expected total number of faults that exist in the software before testing 
B (t)= failure detection rate, also called the failure intensity of a fault 
m(t)= expected number of failures detected at time t 
The above differential equation can be easily solved and is given by 
m(t) = a' I - e ' ( 2 ) 
2o4.3 NHPP Innection S-shape Model 
The inflection S-shaped model (Ohba, 1984) is based on the dependency of faults by 
postulating the following assumptions: 
1. Some of the faults are not detectable before some other faults are removed. 
2. The probability of failure detection at any time is proportional to the current number of 
detectable faults in the software. 
3. Failure rate at each detectable fault is constant and identical. 
4. The isolated fauhs can be entirely removed. 
Assume 
1 + pc""' - (J) 
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Where the parameters b and p represent the failure- detection rate and the inflection factor, 
respectively. From Eq. (5,15), the mean value fiinction is given by: 
This model is called the inflection S-shaped NHPP model (Ohba.1984). 
The failure intensity function is given by: 
We then obtain the expected number of remaining errors at 
timet 
, a(n p)e'" 
For type 1 data, the estimate of parameters a and b for specified t\ using the MLE method 
can be obtained by solving the following equations simultaneously: 
And 
i i - f i - i - 23 e *"''> 
(6) a-e '}(t +^c"•) 
Similarly, for type 2 data, the estimate of parameters a and b for specified 6 using the MLE 
method can be obtained by solving the following equations; 
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And 
2.4.4 NHPP Delayed S-Shape Model 
We now discuss a stochastic model for a software en-or detection process based on NHPP 
in which the growth curve of the number of detected software errors for the observed 
failure data is S-shaped7 called delayed S- shaped NHPP model (Yamada, 1984). The 
software error detection process described by an S-shaped curve can be characterized as a 
learning process in which test-team members become familiar with the test environment, 
testing tools, or project requirements, i.e. their test skills gradually improve. [18]The 
delayed S-shape model is based on the following assumptions: 
1. All fauhs in a program are mutually independent from the failure detection point of 
view. 
2 The probability of failure detection at any time is proportional to the current number 
of faults in software. 
3. The proportionality of failure detection is constant. 
4. The initial error content of the software is a random variable. 
5. A software system is subject to failures at random times caused by errors present in the 
system. 
6. The time between failures (i-1)"' and i* depends on the time to the 
(i-1)'^ failure. 
7. Each time a failure occurs, the error or which caused it is immediately removed and no 
other errors are introduced. 
Assume 
b i n = , t i 
bt + J -^^ ^ 
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where b is the error detection rate per error in the steady- state. The mean value function 
can be obtained as: 
m{t)-a[l-(l4-ht)e'^'J '^-^,::: a] 
Which shows an S-shaped curve? This model is called the. delayed S-shape NHPP model 
for such an error detection process, in which the observed growth curve of the cumulative 
number of detected errors is S-shaped (Yamada, 1983). The corresponding failure 
intensity function is; 
A(t) ^- ab'ie '^  (3) 
The reliability growth of the software system is: 
R(s|ti = e^"'^'-''""^'=e"^^'''''''^'""'"''''"""'l (4) 
The expected number of errors remaining in the system at time t is given by: 
bx 
n{l) =•- m O O - n-!(l> = a{J + b t ) c C/,) 
For type 1 data, the estimate of parameters a and b using the MLE method can be obtained 
by solving the following equations simultaneously: 
a =, 
and 
i - i 
Similarly, for type 2 data, the estimates of parameters a and b for specified 13 using the 
JVELE method can be obtained by solving the following equations: 
n • 
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2n *:• nh,s.,'c ' 
— •= > s -t.'if ii ii I 'I II III I - , t iiYs 
h rrr ' jl (1 I U % '" I <-^' 
2.4. 5 NHPP Imperfect Debugging Model 
In this section, the development of a software reliability model (pham, 1996) that addresses 
the problems of multiple failure types and imperfect debugging based on an N H P P for 
predict ing software performance measures is discussed. The model al lows for three 
different error types, categorized by the difficuhy of removal and detection. Critical errors 
( type 1) are very difficult to detect and remove, major errors ( type 2) are difficult to detect 
and remove, and minor errors (type 3) are easy to detect and remove. 
Notat ion 
a expected number of software errors to be eventually detected, 
bi error detection rate per type i error, i = l , 2 , 3 ; 0 < b i < b 2 <b3 <1 
P, content proportion of type i errors 
X(t) intensity function or error detection rate 
Ni(t) cumulat ive number of type i errors 
n(t) number of errors to be eventually detected plus the number of errors introduced to 
the program by t ime t 
Bj type i error introduction rate that satisfies, 0< Bi< 1 
m.i(t) expected number of software type i detected errors 
by t ime t 
The N H P P imperfect debugging model is based on the following assumpt ions: 
1 W h e n detected errors are removed, it is possible to introduce new errors. 
2 The probabili ty o f finding an error in a program is proportional t o the number of 
remaining errors in the program. 
3 The probability of introducing a new error is constant. 
4 Three types of errors exist 
92 
• type 1 errors (critical): very difficult to detect 
• type 2 errors (major): difficult to detect 
• type 3 errors (minor); easy to detect 
5. The parameters a and bi for i= 1,2,3 are unknown constants. 
The error detection phenomenon in the software is modeled by an NHPP . 
The function m(t) is given as the solution of the following system of differential 
equations:[l,6,8,9] 
4 - I m . ft) I = fi. I n , I t ) ~ rw. ( t ) | 
a c) 
m(t) = 22 m^  (t> 
• i - 1 
/ j . < 0 ) -up., 
{ i > 
Solving the above system of differential equations simultaneously, we obtain the following 
results (Phamt 1996): 
m (I) ap, [l-e-^" ^^ "^^  
( I - y ^ ) 
A(t) = ap,b^c '^  ^^ '^'' 
(2) 
(3) 
and 
ap, 
The software reliability fiinction is given by: 
(4) 
Parameter Estimation 
r t 
(5) 
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The model parameters a,bi,b2,b3 are estimated using the MLE method. For type 1 data 
(the data on the cumulative number of detected errors), suppose that the data are available 
in the form of (tj ,Yij), where Yjj are the cumulative number of failures type j detected up 
to time ti for i=l,2,. ,.,n and j=l,2,3. Assuming the fault detection process is NHPP, the 
likelihood fijnction L(a,bi,b2,b3) for given data (ti ,Yij), i=l,2,...,n, and j=l,2,3 is as 
follows: 
U(Lbj!yb,}- PR\fl(mfO}^ii,mp,}:=h:j,r>rp,) 
~ y- : friAt/) •A 
•' ^ , . . . ^ j 
nfii^ ^""'-"^ V ... , ) . j m , ; f. i-«w., i*, (6) 
where 
m , i r . } •••• 
tip 
(1 - n,) 
[|.,,..,^ -'-^ .'^ '^ ':j (7; 
Taking the log likelihood function, we obtain 
)• •• • ' " * » U , • ' X "•'^•'••' -- - , : . 'I i t • , : ' V ' l • • • • ( • " • • *" • 
^Ud.b .b;,b,y- >,2-|l'.. "• ', ;Jtol%«/)'• <«,;{;, pj"'ira|:v;.;»y,^^ 
m 
Taking the partial derivatives of the log like function, ln[L(a,b] b2b3)] with respect to the 
unknown parameters, a, bi,b2,b3 and setting them equal to zero, we obtain the following 
system of equations: 
94 
cV 
^ 1 1-1.5, i:f.c ' j . | ^ I 
Li>"w-.^'. i J 'y ^n:T:;7r .•.-.^/A,,.r'- (10) 
~apj,e •iK:>' 
For type 2 data (the data on failure occurrence times),assume that the data set is available 
in the form of ni type 1 errors, n2 type 2 errors, and n^ type 3 errors, and Si,i < S i,2< Si^i, 
82,1 < 82,2 < S2,m, where Sij is the actual time that the J*'' failure of type i error occurs. 
Again, using the MLE method, the likelihood function for the NHPP model in a given data 
set is as follows. 
• nil 'ini' 
where 
!.>, — n i i i X " ! -^ i , j . . »^ ,?.«!:•' • *^ i.f.y f 
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to the unknown parameters and setting them 
equal to zero, we obtain the following results: 
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Z .^- = i\, — (tp j^ •$,,(' 
- ( ' I , !i.-V 
< « 2 > 
ri3) 
.'7,(1 - / I I 
for j=l,2,3. Solving Eqs. 12 and 13 simultaneously gives the maximum likelihood 
estimates of parameters a, bi,b2 and ba. 
FIGURE : ROCOF Plots For Various Models (a) JM model; (b) NHPP models; (c) 
LV and L models . 
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CKA^T^^S 
SOFTWARE COST MODELS 
AND 
ANALYSIS OF PREDICTIVE QUALITY 
3.1 Introduction 
In defining important software cost factors, a cost model should help software and 
managers answer the following questions: 
1. How should resources be scheduled to ensure the on-time and efficient delivery of a 
software product'!" 
2. Is die software product sufficiently reliable for release (e.g. have we done enough 
testing?) 
3. What information does a manager or software developer need to determine the release of 
software from current software testing activities? 
The following notations and basic assumptions are applied throughout this chapter. 
Notation 
mi (T) expected number of errors to be detected by time T 
a total number of software errors to be eventually detected 
b exponential index 
}^ .(T) fault detection rate per unit time or intensity function 
X mission time 
R(x/T) reliability ftinction of software by time T for a mission time x 
T software release time 
C 1 software test cost per unit time 
C2 cost of removing each error per unit time during testing 
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E(T) expected total cost of a software system by 
y time to remove an error during testing phase 
|i y expected time to remove an error during testing phase which is E(Y) 
•; "'^-ii 
A »isji • 
-+-
l.«j?»-i<i!i I "'0«5«>!.>.: 'I ».-»«iJHj O i x s u t i c x ' i 
i. ..|.,..-.,.-vfU-
<;:ost 
J i .N ' : tn : ; -^iiSt 
V 
y / 
l ' i . : r i , ihv >.:i;-.l 
T i i s i c 
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General assumptions 
1. The cost to perform testing is proportional to the testing time. 
2. The cost to remove errors during the testing phase is proportional to the total time of 
removing all errors detected by the end of the testing phase. 
3. There is a risk cost related to the reliability at each release time point. 
4. The time to remove error during testing follows a truncated exponential distribution. 
5. Without loss of generality, the Goel-Okumoto NHPP model w i^ll be used as a reliability 
function. [1] 
Let y be a random variable of time to remove an error. Based on assumption (4), the 
probability density distribution of y is given by 
,V( V ) " f 
7 , , , . , for 0^>'^ ' / ; (I) I At^  dz 
Where To is the maximum time to remove an error .The expected time to remove each 
error is [8] 
/x. =: Hiy)^^ \yx{y)dy 
•iiV 
D 
After simplifications we obtain 
3„1.1 A Software Cost Model with Risk Factor 
The expected software system cost, E (T), is defined as: 
(1) The cost to perform testing; 
QQ 
(2 ) 
(2) The cost incurred in removing errors during the testing phase, and 
(3) A risk cost due to software failure. 
a. The cost to perform testing is given by [2] 
b. The expected total time to remove all N (T) errors is 
> • ^ | > V C 7 " > ] J E : [ > ^ 1 1 ? = rtiXTytj. 
Hence the expected cost to remove all errors detected by time T can be expressed as 
.v.yrj 
/c',(7"> = <r:"-.Al 2^:1^ 
U ' •"' 
= C,m«;r)ju, 
c. The risk cost due to software failure after releasing the software is 
Where C3 is the cost due to software failure. 
Therefore, the expected total software cost can be expressed (Zhang, 1998) as 
FAT) ~ CT I CJ'niiTlU: " C'Jl " /^fv! / ) ] (4) 
The mean value function m (T) is 
"*/ 
The error detection rate fiinction is 
J<7 AiT)"abe 
The reliability of the software is 
m^ 
M)-
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3.1.2 A Generalized Software Cost Model 
Notations: 
Co set-up cost for software test 
C3 cost of removing an error per unit time during the operational phase 
C4 loss due to software failure 
W expected time to remove an error during the warranty period in the 
Operation phase, which is E (W) 
|iw period of warranty time 
Tw the discount rate of the testing cost 
Additional Assumptions: 
(6)There is a set-up cost at the beginning of the software development process. 
(7)The cost of testing is a power function of the testing time. This means that at the 
beginning of the testing, the cost increases with a higher gradient, slowing down later. 
(8)The time to remove each error during the warranty period follows a truncated 
exponential distribution. 
(9)The cost to remove errors during the warranty period is proportional to the total time of 
removing all errors detected between the intervals of (T, Tw ). 
Similarly, fi-om assumption 8, the truncated exponential density fiinction of error removal 
time during warranty period is [3] 
Therefore, the expected time to remove an error during the warranty period is 
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''.,. fo 
The expected software system cost comprises of the set- up cost, the cost to do testing, the 
cost incurred in removing errors during the testing phase and during the warranty period, 
and the risk cost in releasing the software system by time T. Hence, the expected total 
software system cost E(T) can be expressed as follows (pham, 1999): [4] 
\ vhLTcO<u<l ( IH) 
3.1.3 A Cost Model with Multiple Failure Errors 
In this section, a software cost model is presented under the following assumptions: 
(1) The cost of debugging an error during the development phase is lower than in the 
operational phase. 
(2) The cost of removing a particular type of error is constant during the debugging phase. 
(3) The cost of removing a particular type of error is constant during the operational phase. 
(4) The cost of removing critical errors is more expensive than major errors, and the cost of 
removing major errors is more expensive than minor errors. 
(5)There is a continuous cost incurred during the entire time of the debugging period. [9] 
Notation 
T software release time 
C,i cost of fixing a type i error during the test phase i=l ,2,3 
Ci2 cost of fixing a type i error during the operation phase (Cii< C i2, i=l,2,3) 
C3 cost oftesting per unit time 
E(T) expected cost of software 
102 
Ro pre-specified software reliability 
Tr debugging time required to attain minimum cost subject to a reliability constraint 
Te debugging time required to attain minimum cost subject to the number of 
remaining errors constraint 
Trei debugging time required to attain maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint 
/ t (T) = f ^;/~^ £^"^i'"*<^> \'gir}di 
5 
J 
3.1.4 Cost Subject to Reliability Constraint 
Consider the expected software cost E(T) and the software reliability R(xl(T) as the 
evaluation criteria. We determine the optimum release time that Iminimizes the expected 
software cost subject to attaining a desired reliability level Ro. then the optimization 
problem can be formulated as 
M i n i m i s e JZ(T> 
Subject tn R<xrr)>Ro (1) 
Where, 
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R(x\t) = e ^ 1 f> • 
> •• i \ . • ' A ):i I fi M - I I 
( 2 ) 
11 ' - • 
r- * - l 
+ 2 1 <^ ". / t '5^ T, ( / :i m < 7" > i |- .1,' (./ )J! (3 J 
3.1.5 Cost Subject to the Number of Remaining Errors Constraint 
Consider both the expected total software system cost, E (T), and the expected number of 
failure type i errors remaining in the system, ^^.(T) as the evaluation criteria. The optimal 
release problem can be formulated as 
Minimise E(T) (I) 
SubjCCl lO Tfi.i.TiSd, i = 1 . 2 , 3 . 
Where 
* ~ Pi 
and di is the accepted number of remaining type i errors. Define 
(2) 
h\i ^^P> 
T.. = 
' d,{l- P,) 
(3) 
n - A yi • 
The tunction yyi^{T) is, of course, decreasing in T for all T. Then /^,.(7')<di if and only if 
T>T i^ 
3,1.6 Software Reliability Subject to cost constraint 
Consider both the software reliability R (xj|T) and the expected software cost E (T) as the 
evaluation criteria. The optimal policies problem can be formulated as 
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i (1) 
I S u b j e c t to E<T>^Gi •u 
Where Cr is the maximum amount allowable. 
3.2 Analysis of Predictive Quality. 
Given that we have observed data ti,t2,..., ti-i, we want to predict the random variable Ti. 
More precisely, we want a good estimate of 
FXt)=P(T,<t; (1) 
Or, equivalently, of the reliability function [5] 
R i ( t ) = ^ 1 - F ( 0 ( 2 ) 
From one of the prediction systems described earlier we can calculate a predictor /?" ( / ) 
A 
A user is interested in 'closeness' of J7 (r) to the unknown true Fi (t). In fact he/she may 
be only interested in summary statistics such as mean (or median) time to failure, ROCOF, 
etc. The operation of calculating f (t) can be repeated for each value of i. Comparison 
of f \i) with the (later-observed) for i=s,...,q (using u-plot and prequential likelihood 
ratio PLR) [6] 
3.2.1 The u- Plot Method for Detecting Consistent Bias 
Consider the following sequence of transformations: 
= ^.(0 U 
Ei^ ach is a probability integral transform of the observed ti using the previous 
calculated predictor f . based upon ti t2,..., ti-i .Now, if each p. were identical to the true 
A ^ 
f, it is easy to see that the Ui would be realizations of the independent uniform U(0,1) 
random variables, consequently, we can reduce the problem of examining the closeness of 
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p I to f , (for some range of values of i) to the question of if the sequence (u ij'loolcs 
like' a random sample from U (0,1). [7],[8] 
Procedure: Calculate ui at each stage i, plot sample distribution of the us, test to see if 
there is evidence it is not uniform The' distance ' between them can be summarized in 
various ways. We shall use the Kolmogorov distance, which is the maximum absolute 
vertical difference. 
What is u-plot telling us: That the predictions are 'biased', in fact all these predictions are 
too pessimistic since the plots are below the line origin unit slope (i.e. the. u's are 'too 
large'; large u's means overestimating the chance of early failure, i.e. pessimism) 
3..2.2 The Prequential likelihood Ratio for Detecting Noise and Bias 
We want a general way of analyzing predictive accuracy that takes account of all kind of 
deviation from the truth. The prequential likelihood function allowed general comparison 
between different positions: 
The prequential likelihood (PL) is defined as follows .The predictive distribution p Q ) 
for Ti based on Utj, •, ti-i ,will be assumed to have a probability density function (pdf) 
/ i\t ) ^= Fi H ) .For predictions Tj+i, 
Tj+2 Tj+n of, the prequential likelihood is: 
A comparison of two prediction systems, A and B, can be made via their prequential 
likelihood ratio. 
• , , , j-^n 
IJ ^/(t.) 
( 2 ) 
n ^rxt,) 
.7 + 1 
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It can be shown that, if PLR „ --> as n - > co, prediction system B is discredited in favor of 
A. 
1 
f 
( 
n 
\ 
\ • I ; •• ^ ---, 
U t-^>\^ T* 
_ i 
• o f » i j 1 ^ v j i fc^ 
3.2.3 Recalibration 
In several data sets certain prediction systems seem to be 'only, biased. In cases like this, 
where the relationship between prediction and reality is approximately stationary, we can 
atitempt to estimate this relationship and use the estimate to improve future predictions a 
process of recalibration. Formally, we have [8] 
i"i ( t ) =G .^ VF^ ( fc) ] U) 
Where, at least approximately, Gi does not depend upon i. If we are assured of the 
stationarity , we might reasonably attempt to find a 'best' estimate of the fiinction, 
LI I say, to obtam an adapted predictor 
i^; ( fc) =c?; [ # . (fc) 1 ( 2 > 
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One of the simplest is to use the u-plot, &, shown in Figure below, The procedure is the as 
follows; 
Stage 1: Find u-plot for predictions made before Ti (i.e. based on subset of ti t2,..., ti.i. 
Stage 2: use the prediction system to make a 'raw' prediction, F/\t ) . 
Stage 3: Transform the raw prediction via the u-plot to obtain the adapted prediction, 
f\'} 
The { Ft \J ) } sequence can be used to generate 
as before, since ti (the realization of Ti) is observed after/^, is calculated. We can thus 
form u*-plots in a usual way The procedure is only designed to improve 'bias'. 
Recalibration use u-plot analysis of PAST prediction to improve FUTURE predictions. 
How well does this work? 
* it is a propet prediction system -only the past is used to predict the future. 
* get sequence of recalibrated predictions i^/1 / ) and later true tjS 
* analyze the predictive accuracy using u*-plots, etc 
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3.2.4 The supermodel 
The supermodel predictors [9] are based on a linear combination between the initial 
predictors (cumulative distribution functions) which correspond to each basic model: 
l\if) • V fvrF'io. k = 1,2. 
<ti 
Or, respectively, to the probability density functions: 
i.\i) r-. V ^ljl{i\ k = 1,2, .,. n 
Where W^ are the weights factors 
(2) 
T--1 K ''• l . * i . . . . • '^ m 
And m is the number of models which form the supermodel. 
In this approach die weight factor for prediction system r at a certain stage n is: 
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rf ? V'; — . 
1, m 
(4) 
where PL is the notation of the prequential likelihood flinction. 
Considering P the maximum number of pdf s to be used in order to calculate PL functions, 
the expression of the weight factor for each model becomes; [2] 
pj' t l '•" 
^v 
->: > • ; , . < ! - ! 
f:: ^ ,.l. m 
{>) 
a) The weight factors are calculated by maximizing the likelihood function 
m i L x I 
n-1 {~ n~. 
•I . r^ 
b) In this approach, the weight factor for prediction system r at a certain stage n is; 
\v 
^f'l.«-
.n«-cij.. 
--:-^ .^ r=lvm:: 
B5 n - f 
where PL is the notation of the prequential likelihood function. 
The weights can be obtained from the following deductions, considering Mr a prediction 
system and ti,t2 ,..., tj.i the known inter failures times then the cumulative probability 
distribution function (cdf) of Tj conditioned on ti t2,..., tj.i is; 
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/V /y . •./;/.„.; . ./ 
if. 
where 
In the case of prior ignorance we assume an equal prior probability to each prediction 
system: 
P r ^ M J 1 
i n 
f ~=: I . : . . . . t f l 
and so replacing in the previous formula we obtain the initial expression for the weight 
factor: 
m 
' ' I t n , t. Mr) 
f ' r U n - : . . - l l i M r ^ P L S n - l 
Z ,,, '''"ft.,.- X:M^ ly^iu y AvMk) Zpr/i.-i 
ITl k -1 
Considering p the maximum number of pdf s to be used in order to calculate PL ilinctions, 
the expression of the weight factor for each model becomes: 
\% 
in 
V IM ) 
lVv\y 
I- p r. 
J2 ; 
^ 
n-j 
m i^ y 
, r-^Loi 
c) The switching approach is just a cruder version of the previous 
approach. The weight factor is either 1 (for the model with the biggest 
PL)or 0 (for the rest) 
w;, n. otherwise 
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OPTIMAL TIME INTERVALS FOR TESTING HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Optimal Time Intervals for Testing Hypotheses on 
Computer Software Errors 
This chapter discusses certain stochastic aspects of the software reliability problem. First 
an empirical stopping rule for debugging and testing computer software is discussed. Then 
some results are presented on choosing a time interval for testing the hypothesis that a 
software system contains no errors, given certain cost and risk constraints. [1, 12, 14] 
4.1.1 Introduction and Summary 
Research into improving and measuring computer software reliability has progressed along 
several different directions. Typical of these are structured programming, proofs of 
correctness of programs, and the stochastic analysis of software failure data. 
This chapter focuses attention on certain decision theoretic aspects of software reliability. 
These aspects arise quite naturally when software failure data are analyzed statistically. In 
particular, a procedure is developed for testing the hypothesis that a given software system 
contains no errors; then an optimal interval of time is determined for which the software 
has to be exercised in order to test this hypothesis. [2] 
4.1.2 Jelinsiii & Moranda model 
Jelinski & Moranda [2] have proposed a model for describing failures of computer 
software. Variations of this model have been considered by Shooman and others [3]. The 
applicability of this model includes analyzing the software failure data from the Apollo 
program and from a U.S. Navy system. [3] 
Denote the initial error content in a large software system, such as an operating system, by 
N, N is, of course unknown. By assumption, the failure rate at any time is proportional to 
the residual number of errors in the software. Thus, if n, T2 , ...., denote the times at which 
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software errors are detected and assumed to be instantaneously corrected, then the failure 
rate at any time between Xi-i and Xi is (N- i + 1 )0, where O is some unknown constant of 
proportionality. In reality, a finite amount of time is taken to correct an error. In this 
chapter, it is assumed that the software is not exercised while the correction is in progress. 
[5, 7, 8] 
Let Ti = Tj - Xi-i, i = 1,2,..., with xo = 0; then the s-cumulative distribution function of the 
times between failures T; is [6] 
Let ti,t2, , tn be the realizations of Ti,T2, , !„ respectively. Given ti,t2, , tn, a natural 
objective is to estimate O and N; n is always less than or equal to N. A more pragmatic 
objective is to obtain a stopping-rule for debugging the software. The stopping rule should 
be such that we can be reasonably well assured that the software contains no errors. The 
above two objectives wi 11 be concurrently achieved. [7-9] 
i) Parameter Estimation and an Empirical Stopping Rule 
Estimating N and O, developing a stopping rule are based upon analyzing the behavior of 
the likelihood function; [4] 
L ' ( 0 ,N ) = rt (N - i + 1)0 exp (- (N - i + 1)0 t ) 
i = 1 
Define 
L ((D,N) = ln(L*((D,N)),T = Z t.k = Z t(<D - 1) 
Since N takes only integer values, the unique maximum likelihood (ML) estimator ofN, 
A 
say N , is that value of N which simultaneously satisfies 
f N ^ In ((2^_1)^) + In - ^ > 0 
\ TN-K / VN - n j 
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=ln( (N- l )T-K V TN-K + ln 
^ N - n + 0 
V N - n 
>0 (1) 
) 
Given N,the ML estimator of O is 
( A 
A (2) 
V T N - K J 
ii) Properties of the maximum likelihood estimators 
The estimators given by (1) and (2) are quite straightforward to obtain. However, the fact 
A 
when n is much smaller than N, N is highly misleading and has been grossly overlooked. 
A 
Specifically, when it/Tis small, N tends to be unrealistically large, and a slight decrease 
in k/t leads to a disproportionately large increase in N • The ML estimator of A^  is 
unstable, and can lead to erroneous conclusions. [12, 18, 19] 
As k/T becomes large, that is, if the times between failures during the latter stages of 
A 
testing are greater than those during the earlier stages, N tends to be close to n .The 
observed number of failures. Thus N is approximately equal n is an indicator of the fact 
that the program is closed to being debugged, and should therefore provide us with a 
A 
stopping rule. However, has been pointed out, it is possible thatN ~ n, and yet the true 
A A 
value A'^  may be far from N . Thus N ~ n does not always indicate fact that the program is 
closed to being debugged and, therefore, has to be interpreted with caution. For a more 
conclusive analysis we will have to examine the behavior of the likelihood function 
4.1.5 The relative likelihood functions and a stopping rule 
The relative likelihood function of N, R (N) is defined question as 
r A 
R ( N ) = : L N,( |)(N) 
V 
^ 
y 
r 
/L 
A A A 
N , * ( N ) 
V J 
(J; ( N ) = n /( TN - K ) 
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The shape of R (N) is a fiinction of n, k, T. We will need to compare R (N) with the s-
normal relative likelihood fbnction of N, Rnormai (N), defined as [4] 
normal V / r 
1 -
- - ( N - N ) 
var( N ) = r 
var N 
n 
\ 
V N - i + l y 
r 1 ^ I -
V ^ =' N - i + lj 
On the basis of previous discussions, plus some Monte Carlo analysis, following are the 
steps of the stopping rule. 
1. Compare N using (1). [7] 
A A 
2. If N == n .proceed to step 3; if N > n, observe another failure interval t 
3. Compute R (N) and R ^^^ (N ) for various values of N, and see if the plots of R 
(N) and R ^^ ^^  ( N ) agree well with each other. If the plots show a large 
disparity, then N is a misleading estimator of N. When this happens ,observe 
another failure interval tn+i and repeat the above steps .If the plots of R(N) and 
A 
R ^^ ^^1 ( N ) agree well ,then N ~ n is a good estimator of N and we do not have 
to test the software flirther to obtain tn+i .[4] 
4.1.6. A Test of Hypothesis That the Software Contains No Errors: An Optimal 
Time Interval for Testing. 
Let us assume that a given software package has been subjected to the debugging process 
and that all the steps of our proposed stopping rule have been satisfactorily under taken. A 
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4.1.8 Choosing t a based on cost consideration 
We can also choose the t a discussed above based on cost considerations and the mission 
timet a-
Let Ci be the constant cost per unit time for testing the software. Let C z be the constant 
cost incurred by the failure of the software during the mission time t m. Later on, we shall 
assume that, C| changes with time. Three outcomes are possible: 
i. The software fails during the additional testing time ta, in which case it is not ready for 
operational use; the total cost is 
c, t ,o < t < t. 
where t is the time at which failure occurs. 
ii. The software does not fail during the additional testing time, but fails during its 
operation at some time t; when this happens, the total cost is 
C , t a + C 2 , t a < t < t a + t m 
iii. No failure of the software is encountered; the total cost is 
C , t a , t a + tm ^ t 
The above cost structure ignores the costs loss in operational usage times incurred by pre-
operational testing. 
The total s-expected cost is therefore: [12] 
t t +f 
l a La U m 
E(C)=lc,tH'* '-dt+ j(C,t, + C.)n"**-dt 
t a 
+ jC,t.(i)?i"*'-dt 
t +t 
In order to solve for t.. We shall minimize E(C) since 
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^ E ( C ) = ; ^ - * ^ - ( C , - C2^ exp( (1) t . ) ) 
d t 
exp((t)tJ = l-exp(-(|)U 
We claim that when Ci > C z ^ C X p f ((|)t„,) , the value of ta at which E(C) is 
minimized is zero. That is, when the cost of testing is much larger than the cost of an 
operational failure, no additional testing is necessary. However, a potential user may still 
wish to test the program for t ta (P) units of time and be assured that the power of his test 
is at least p. [20] 
If on the contrary Ci< C2 ^ t^  ^ X p f ((|) t„ ) ,then tj =00 minimizes E(C), This means 
that we should test exercise the software for an indefinite amount of time. Here again, a 
potential user may test for ta (P) units of time and get ill assurance that the power of his 
test is at leastp. 
The assumption that Ci 's a constant may not be realistic in many situations. In addition to 
this, this assumption may lead us to the case of indefinite testing as is shown above. We 
shall now relax this assumption and explore the consequences. 
Suppose that the cost of testing i s C i ( t ) , where C i ( t ) a convex non decreasing 
t 
flinction oft is. Let us denote the derivative of Ci ( t ) evaluated at t = 0 by Ci ( ^ ) • 
We can now verify that when: 
Ci'(0)>C2(t)expf((t)tJ 
ta =0 will minimize E(C ). If this happens, we can choose ta (P) as our additional test 
time. 
If on the contrary 
C . ( 0 ) < C 2 < | ) e x p f ( ( | ) t . ) ,then 
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t a - C\'' [C2(t>expf(( |)t ,) J, will minimize E(C); CT'C*) is the inverse of 
Ci (*) As an example ifC 1 ( t ) = C i ^^ , for some a > 0, then 
^ ^  l^^G(|)expf((|)tJ 
a da 
For the above situation, if ta - ta (P).and should we test for ta units of time, then we will 
not only be minimizing total s-expected cost, but will also achieve a power of at least p.If 
ta^ta (P) > then C(eXp[ata(P)]-eXp[ata]) i represents the increase in the cost of 
testing to achieve a at least p 
4.2 How to Measure Software Reliability and How Not T o 
> Introduction 
The intention behind this work was to provoke discussion about some aspects of software 
reliability measurement. The method adopted is one of critical analysis of some previous 
research, together with suggestions for future directions. The aim of this section is to 
improve the range of tools available to software managers. Some of the criticisms of 
existing techniques in the following pages rest on fairly subtle mathematical points and 
that they have important practical implications. [1] 
4.2.1 Classical Reliability Measures. 
Let us begin by looking briefly at the measures which have been used in the hardware 
field. One of the most careful accounts is still that of Barlow & Proschan .They gives two 
basic measures which will generally have meaning reliability and availability. 
> Reliability 
Barlow & Proschan give two definitions. We shall consider here only the more general 
one: Interval reliability is the probability that at a specified time, T, the system is operating 
and will continue to operate for an interval of duration x. 
In many situations, steady-state interval reliability, i.e. the limit of the above as T-+cx), will 
suffice (so long as it exists). 
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> Availability 
There are two common definitions: 
i) Point availability is the probability that the system will be able to operate v^thin the 
tolerances at a given instant of time, t. 
ii) Interval availability is the s-expected fraction of a given interval of time (a, b) that the 
system will be able to operate within the tolerances (repair and/or replacement allowed). 
Barlow & Proschan define steady-state (limiting) interval availability to be the limit of the 
above as b—»oo, with a = 0. It is also some- times sensible to consider a limiting version of 
point availability.[3] 
4.2.2 How adequate are these? 
Given that, for reasons of simplicity, it is necessary to summaries all available information 
into ii single numerical measure of reliability, then one or other of these definitions will be 
appropriate for most situations. Often, however, there is no such overriding need for 
simplicity; and more insight into the process of failures will be gained by considering, say, 
percentiles of time-to-next-failure distributions. This is particularly true of software, as 
shown below. [4] 
A technical criticism can be made of one of the availability definitions which, again, will 
be particularly serious in the case of software. Consider interval availability: "the s-
expected ft-action of a given interval of time that the system will. ... Operate. ...". What is 
really of interest is the actual fi^action of time the, system will operate, but this is a random 
variable. Merely quoting the s-expected value of the random variable gives no idea of how 
much the actual result might deviate fi-om this. We need the distribution of the fraction in 
order to be able to calculate a tolerance interval. In many practical situations, of course, the 
steady-state availability is most appropriate. In such cases it might be thought that the 
fraction of an interval (0, T) that the system will operate would converge in probability, for 
large T, to the steady-state s-expected fraction (i.e. the steady-state availability). This result 
would normally be established using the chebycheffs inequality .Unfortunately, 
convergence cannot be guaranteed. In fact, if we model the system's behavior by an 
alternating renewal process with the two types of time intervals representing operating and 
repairing, then it can be shown that the fraction of time spent working does converge in 
probability to |a w / (|J w + |i r) (where ^ w and ^ r are the means of the time-to-failure and 
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time-to-repair distributions) as long as these means exist. If the distributions do not have 
moments, convergence may still take place, but it is possible to construct examples where 
it does not. In such a situation, where the steady-state interval reliability does not have the 
interpretation of (probabilistic) limiting fraction of time operating, it is difficult to assign it 
any practical meaning. I contend that we are more likely to encounter this kind of difficulty 
with software than with hardware. 
These comments can be summarized in the following: we should be extremely careful of 
replacing the wealth of information in a probability distribution with single summaries 
whether these are parameters or moments of the distributions. It is worth mentioning the 
origin of the conventional obsession with these summaries. In hardware reliability there is 
justification for thinking that certain complex devices might follow an exponential failure 
law. In such a case, the mean time to failure (or failure rate) totally describes the failure 
behavior and comments such as those above no longer hold. Unfortunately, such 
justification does not apply to software. It remains an open question whether any failure 
law can be developed which reflects the nature and structure of software; but in the 
absence of such a law we should beware of a blind and ignorant adoption of those 
hardware reliability concepts which have the exponential distribution as their basis. 
4.2.3 Software Reliability Measurement 
There are instances, then, where the hardware reliability experience has proved a mixed 
blessing for software reliability. In what follows view of some aspects of software 
reliability measurement. [3] 
> Bugs bared 
At some risk of oversimplifying, bugs (errors) can be defined as those defects in the 
program which cause failures in its dynamic operation. As such, they are the things which 
the software engineer will try to eliminate during program testing and development. Some 
would prefer to concentrate effort on ensuring they never get into the program in the first 
place .One may not get convinced that the advocates of measuring reliability via bug-
counting have presented a strong case. Our objective should be to measure the quality of 
the behavior of the software, its operational reliability, rather than the quality of its state. A 
good program is defined in terms of what it does, not what it is. 
121 
Of course, when the program fails in some way, it is the software engineer's job to find the 
cause(s) of that failure; he has to eliminate bugs. Although the bug eliminator and the 
reliability measurer might be embodied in the same person, the operations are quite 
different and only confusion ensues from combining them. I suspect that the distinction 
might not be a great help in getting better quality software to insist that the reliability 
improvement/measurement interface coincide with that of the contractor/customer? 
It can be argued that the state of a program (number of bugs) determines its performance 
(operational reliability), but any relationship here is likely to be very complicated and 
unknown. Certainly the kind of assumptions which have made seem very naive; thus 
Shooman says; [14] 
"The software failure rate (crash rate) is proportional Number of remaining errors." 
It is easy to imagine a scenario where a program with two bugs in little exercised portions 
of code is more reliable than a program with only one frequently encountered bug. It might 
sometimes be possible to model realistically the relationship between operational 
reliability and number of residual bugs. But why bother? Why introduce this extra risk of 
modeling error, when we can do any thing we want in terms of operational reliability, 
directly? Thus, for example, if we want to estimate the debugging 
Time needed to obtain a specified operational reliability; we can achieve it via a suitable 
model based upon operational reliability. [18] 
> How to measure operational reliability 
Because operational reliability is what we should be measuring, we now have to consider 
ways of doing this. Although problem is a dual one of modeling and estimation, my 
concern is with the former, since it is in the modeling, we must be concerned with some 
unique ties of software. 
Consider a renewal process in continuous tin successive renewals represent successive 
failures of the for simplicity assume initially that repairs are instantaneous (there is 
surprisingly little information available about times). It is probably worth mentioning, also, 
that tin be execution time. [11] 
Such renewal processes can be characterized either in terms of their inter-event times, or 
via the numbers of time intervals. The former method is more appropriate purposes. The 
distributions of failures may have unusual properties, in particular their moments may not 
122 
exist ( viz , are infinite). If this is true then the classical measures such as mean to next 
failure (MTTF), MTBF would be infinite, and any estimates of them (although finite 
themselves) would be meaningless. [18] 
This assertion is qmte revolutionary to say that there is an evidence to support it fi"om 
software failure data. Unfortunately this is not the case as there is no good statistical test of 
the hypothesis that a set of data comes from a moment less population. In any case, the 
nature of the problem is likely to require such a test be based upon a large amount of data. 
Software failure data are still notoriously difficult to obtain in large quantities. 
Support for this idea, then, must be analytic rather than directly evidential. In the 
first place it could be asked, slightly enviously, what evidence there is for the existence of 
moments. Those people who wish to estimate MTTF should be asked to furnish evidence 
that the quantity they are estimating indeed exist. One can always obtain a finite average of 
some data, but it may not estimate a population mean. More seriously, there is the unique 
property of software that it suffers natural degradation; once perfect, it will never fail. If 
we concede, therefore, that there is some chance (however small) that the program is 
perfect, then the mean time to failure must be infinite .This case is so extreme that not even 
fi-actional moments would exist. But is it, indeed, such an extreme assumption? When we 
come to look at the problem of incorporating structural information into our reliability 
model shall consider modular programming -it does not unreasonable to believe that a 
small enough module be perfect. Mills goes much fiirther, asserting that top structuring is 
likely to produce perfect programs, even when they are large [16] 
"The new reality is that you can learn to consistently write programs which are correct ab 
initio, and prove to be or free in their debugging and subsequent use." 
It is possible to construct models which have moment-less time-to-failure distributions 
unexceptional assumptions about the properties of software. Jelinskim & Moranda has 
great flexibility and allows exact distributions of time-to- failure to be computed, with 
associated percentiles, medians, etc, in addition to failure rate measures. If we accept the 
plausibility of models of this kind, it seems to me that we should not baulk at any 
consequences, such as infinite mean time to failure. [14] 
These considerations about the possible non-existence of the mean time to failure may 
cause difficulties with the definition of availability, as mentioned earlier. Even if the 
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Mean does not exist, it might be that the fraction of time available converges in probability 
to some constant, but this cannot be assumed. Detailed knowledge of the distributions of 
time-to-failure and time-to-repair will be needed. Scant attention seems to have been paid 
to repair-time distributions in the literature. [10, 12] 
If we are to eschew the use of mean time-to-failure, what measures are left? We have 
already argued that we should be altogether less obsessed with single measures; preferring 
instead distributions from which we can calculate, if required, many appropriate measures. 
Thus from a time-to-next failure distribution we could quote the probability that the time-
to- next-failure exceeded any required value. Even more attractive are tolerance bounds for 
the time-.to-next failure. These refer to the quantity of most practical interest, the time at 
which the next failure will occur, and can be calculated at any appropriate level; 50%, 
80%, 90%, etc. .It seems that they have a greater intuitive appeal than MITF (even when it 
exists). After all, how can a MTTF are used, except in conjunction with an assumption 
about the distribution, usually exponential, of times to failure? The case against MTTF is 
even stronger in practice, since most models end with s-confidence bounds for MTTF 
being quoted. What practical conclusions can be drawn from the fact that a particular 
interval contains the true MTTF with, say, 90%? 
S-confidence? All of this illustrates a non-mathematical requirement of our modeling 
which must never be forgotten: our work must result in management tools which are 
simple, easy to use, and intuitively meaningfijl. [17, 18, 20] 
A measure of quality which exists under wide conditions, and has a direct intuitive 
meaning, is the failure (hazard) rate. Indeed, for the decreasing failure rate situations which 
we hope to encounter in software, this has a more reasonable interpretation than 
instantaneous mean time-to-,failure. 
4.2.4 Software engineers should be Bayesians 
In this section the intention is to convince oneself that we should use Bayesian 
interpretations and methods for software reliability. 
The subjective interpretation of probability, v/hich is usually associated with the Bayesian 
School, seems more appropriate for software than a frequentist approach. Because each 
program is unique, there is usually no sense in which one can envisage an ensemble of 
repetitions of the reliability measuring operation upon which a frequentist interpretation 
124 
would depend. Since there appears to be considerable disagreement about these matters, it 
is worth considering them in more detail. The best place to start is by carefully analyzing 
the origins of the uncertainty (randomness) concerning the failure behavior of software. 
Why cannot the failure times of a program be predicted exactly? If we knew how the 
program behaved for every conceivable input, and could predict future inputs, then 
suppose it would be possible to predict the next failure epoch. Unfortunately we never 
have such a total knowledge. Most authors, therefore, agree that the failure process is 
random. But what are the precise sources of this randomness? 
(input space;;): 
pipro^idPA] 
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The most widely used conceptual model of software is the input-program-output model 
(Fig. I). This is usually interpreted as follows: some (random) mechanism selects points 
from the input space to be processed by the program and produces points of the output 
space. The program is a mapping of/into 0; that.is/?; I~*0. We observe failures in the 
output whenever the program receives input from the subset IF; this subset is encountered 
randomly, and thus the failures in the output space occur randomly. Thus, if we know the 
properties of the program totally, it might be reasonable to assume that the failure process 
would be random and reflect the fluctuations of the input data stream. It could be modeled 
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by a Poisson process, for example. It is at this point that the reasoning about this model 
usually stops; the only source of randomness is seen in the inputs. 
But what about the program itself, the mapping of/ into 0? Surely there is also uncertainty 
about the nature of the mapping? Imagine that two programming teams have been set the 
same task, each to write a program to the same specification. The resulting programs (p 1, 
p2) then operate identical environments (i.e. have the same input space, I) and their outputs 
are compared (e.g. by a quality-engineer or customer). The comparator will, from the 
program specification, define a single set of correct outputs, and a single set of incorrect 
outputs (failures), 0 r, which together form the total output set, 0. Since the input set is the 
same for both programs, the difference between them is revealed as a difference between 
two mappings from / to 0, with the same subset 0 F defining 
potential failures in each case (Fig. 2). In other words, the two programs will differ in the 
way they partition the input space into a region / F , which will produce failures, and its 
complement. Our uncertainty about the program, then, can be regarded as uncertainty 
about the nature of/ F We might go further and suggest that the size of I pis related to the 
failure rate of the program. 
If we try to predict whether a failure will occur at a particular time, we now must consider 
two sources of uncertainty. We shall not be able to predict which part of the input space 
will be encountered, and we shall not be able to tell whether 
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a given input will lie inside IF for the program .It might be possible to describe the first 
tyf)e of uncertainty in a frequent fashion; we could argue, for example, that for a given 
program, the limiting proportion of inputs which result in a failure defines the probability 
that an unknown input will resuh in failure. But it does not seem to me that this argument 
could be used to define frequentist probability statements about the program itself In most 
cases we shall only write one program; if we wish to talk about the probability that t a 
particular input lies inside IF for this program (or , more precisely, that the random set IF 
contains the input under consideration), we must use a subjective interpretation. 
These effects which necessitate a subjective view of probability statements become more 
pronounced in practice because of the effect of programmer intervention after failure. If the 
program is changed, in a bug-fixing attempt, the partitioning of / changes: I'F C I F 
becomes / F . Although the intention is to improve reliability by removing sources of 
failure, i.e. making I'F C IF , this cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the bug fixing operation 
is itself a new source of uncertainty. [1,6, 10, II] 
The problem, then, is to incorporate the ideas of this reliability. This can be done in many 
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ways; it seems to have been attempted only once, by John Verrall & myself. The brief 
details of this work are as follows. It is assumed till the first source of uncertainty 
mentioned above can be described by a Poisson process (i.e. inputs from I F occur as 
points in a Poisson process in time). This can be justified if points in I F are selected 
randomly, and I F is small. The failure rate of the Poisson process, X, represents the size of 
IF . Since the second source of uncertainty concerns this failure rate, it is treated as a 
random variable. The unconditional failure process therefore compounds these two sources 
of uncertainty , and resuhs in a point process which is not Poisson (viz, times-to-next-
failure are not exponentially distributed).Uncertainty about the efficacy of the 
Bug-fixing operation is also included in the model. 
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Fig. 3, Reliability giowtb with effective bug-fixing. 
To summarize: there are two sources of uncertainty about program reliability, relating to 
the input space and the program itself Since the latter can only be described subjectively, 
any global probability statements which incorporate both types of certainty must be 
interpreted subjectively. At the beginning of this section, we should use Bayesian 
interpretations and methods for software reliability. The essence of Bayes theorem is that 
it provides a means of continuously updating previous reliability measurements in the light 
of new data. Consider the kind of calculation which is possible with model. Figure 3 gives 
a portion of the plot of failure rate which can be obtained, showing the development as 
time passes. Thus, prior to failure /, whilst the program is working without faith in it 
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increases and the failure rate fall. When failure i occurs, faith drops and the failure rate 
increases, but immediately falls by a finite amount owing to the efficacy of the repair. 
After the (instantaneous) repair the program works in continuous time, and during this 
period the failure rate falls continuously. If our faith in the skill of the debugger is not 
sufficiently great to overcome our pessimism at the occurrence of a failure, then a plot such 
as Fig. 4 will result. In fact it is quite possible that faith in a program lessens progressively 
if failures are sufficiently fi^equent, a situation which may occur in practice. The strength of 
the model lies in its ability to produce the appropriate answer automatically; reliability 
growth or reliability decay does not need to be input a priori , The most important 
advantage of Bayesian methods, though, their ability to reflect that attitude to 
programming which has Mills as its best proponent. He states ".never finding the first 
error gives more confidence than finding the last error". The Bayesian, no news is good 
news, property represents this exactly: periods of failure-fi"ee working cause liability to 
improve. It is interesting to compare this with the bug-counting methods of Jelinski & 
Moranda, here reliability improvement can only take place at a failure, since it is only at 
such a time that an error can be removed. Thus they directly contradict the Mills doctrine -
they have increasing faith in the program as failures occur .'[10,12] 
InstantaneQus 
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Fig. 4, Ineffective bug-fixing. 
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4.2.4 Future Work 
Apart from these questions concerning the ability of models to achieve their desired 
objectives, it is striking that these objectives should have been so restricted: There are at 
least two areas where great rewards might be gained by considering wider problems than 
black-box failure point processes. 
> Reliability versus Utility 
A surprising omission from most of the software literature is a concern for the 
consequence of failures. This, again, may be a resuh of the close connection with hardware 
reliability, which has traditionally (and likewise unfortunately) concentrated on modeling 
the failure process. The omission is rectified to some extent in the wider software 
engineering context: management techniques, on the whole, are cost-conscious. This 
literature, unfortunately, tends to be more qualitative than, quantitative. 
Hardware redundancy allows us to make a system as reliable as we desire by using 
sufficiently many components of a given unreliability. It is thus possible to compare the 
improvement in life-cycle cost with the extra system cost needed to make that 
improvement. Since we do not have such techniques for software (and we may never get 
them), it seems to me particularly important that we at least estimate life-time costs of our 
programs. It is wondering that how many projects we would embark on if we based 
decisions on life cycle costs rather than development costs. Buzen et al.] Compared virtual 
machine and conventional operating systems using linear utility functions. Littlewood 
attaches a random cost to each failure mode. Both these approaches, however, assume 
fairly specialized program structure; what is needed is a simple-to-use life-cycle cost 
model for quite general programs. 
It is often argued, against this kind of approach, that we hardly ever have much 
information about costs. This seems unnecessarily defeatist; after all, merely counting 
failures is equivalent to giving a unit cost to each. Surely we always know better than 
that?! [12] 
Most of the earlier part of this chapter concerned with measuring the quality of a single, 
black box program: the equivalent of a device or component in hardware terminology. 
Fortunately, we. Usually have a large amount of information available about the structure 
of the program, and it is sensible to use this in our reliability modeling. This does not; 
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however, seem to be an easy task. Most attempts so far have looked at a fairly specialized 
structure, but the real goal is the modeling of general systems. 
One of the most interesting attempts to go beyond the black, box approach is that of for 
virtual machine techniques. They are able to prove the superiority of the virtual machine 
approach in the organization of a particular operating system under quite weak 
assumptions. Littlewood has treated modular programs by assuming a Markov, or semi 
Markov, dynamic behavior, which show (under a plausible limiting operation) that failures 
of the overall pro gram will occur approximately as a Poisson process. Shooman has 
developed a model which incorporates microstructure via the execution frequencies and 
failure probabilities of paths within the program. 
All of this work is dogged by the difficulty of translating into dynamic behavior the 
structural information which is present in static forms such as program listings. However, 
it is beginning to be obvious that techniques such as modularity and top-down structuring 
are gaining in popularity for a good practical reason: they deliver the goods. If they do 
become more widely used, the following intriguing question becomes of interest: Do these 
methodologies inevitably result in the final program having a particular failure law? The 
case of top-down structuring is particularly interesting in view of the simplicity of the 
structure-three basic program structures .Alternatively, in modular terminology, where we 
imagine a program to be comprised o/subprograms which in turn are comprised of sub-
subprograms, what is the relation- ship between the reliability of a module and the 
reliabilities of the sub modules it comprises? It seems likely that modules and sub modules 
have the same failure law (with, presumably, different parameter values), because the 
methodology used in their creation is similar. What would such a failure law be? An 
answer in a special case is given in my Markov model, where it is proved that if the 
subprograms follow a Poisson law, then the program itself will also (in the limit). It would 
be of great interest to see whether there are other cases where the form of the failure law is 
dictated by program structure. 
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OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TEST RESOURCES FOR SOFTWARE 
RELUBILITY 
GROWTH MODELING IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Component-based software development approach has become a trend in integrating 
modern software systems. To ensure the overall reliability of an integrating software 
systems, its software component have to meet certain reliability requirements, subject to 
some testing schedule and resource constraints. Efficiency improvement of the system 
testing can be formulated as a combinatorial optimization problem with known cost, 
reliability, effort, and other attributes of the system components. This chapter considers 
"software component testing resources allocation " for a system with single or multiple 
applications, each with pre-specified reliability requirements. The relation between failure 
rates of components and "cost to decrease this rate" is modeled by various types of 
reliability-growth curves. Closed-form solutions to the problem for systems with one 
single application are developed, and then "hov/ to solve the multiple application problem 
using nonlinear programming techniques" are described. Also examined are the 
interactions between the system components, and inter-component failure dependencies are 
included in the modeling formula. In addition to regular systems, the technique is extended 
to address fault-tolerant systems. A procedure for the systematic approach to the testing 
resources allocation problem is developed, and its application in a case study of a 
telecommunications software system is described. This procedure is automated in a 
reliability allocation tool for any easy specification of the problem and an automatic 
application of the technique. [2] 
NOTATIONS 
Abs (.) absolute function 
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A i application i, 1 < i < M 
Cj coverage measure for Cj 
Cj componentj,] 1 < i < N 
d i fixed amount of testing time allowed for A i 
Dj the testing time invested in C j 
D total testing-time invested 
f i (kj) function relating (Xj) to testing time 
M number of software applications 
N number of software components 
R i (t) pre-specified reliability requirement for A i 
Wj weighting fiinction for Dj in the total testing time 
5 i sum of failure rates of the components in A i 
5 fixed total failure-rate constraint 
A partial derivative operator 
ej,k k == 0, 1, 2: parameters in the Pareto fimction with respect to C j 
Xj,o initial failure rate in C j at time 0 
Xj failure rate in Cj during testing 
\ij failure decay parameter for Cj during testing 
0 Lagrange multiplier 
PJ l -Tj 
o ij usage indicator for A i on C j 
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5.1.1 Background 
Modem complex software-systems are often developed with components supplied by 
contractors or independent teams under various environments. In particular, component-
based software engineering [4], [14] has drawn tremendous attention in developing cost-
effective and reliable applications to meet short time-to- market requirements. For systems 
integrated with such modules or components, the system-testing problem can be 
formulated as a combinatorial optimization problem with known cost, reliability, effort, 
and other attributes of the system components. The best known system-reliability problem 
of this type is the series-parallel redundancy allocation problem, where either system 
reliability is maximized or total system testing cost/effort is minimized. Both formulations 
generally involve system-level constraints on allowable cost, effort, and/or minimum 
system-reliability levels. This series-parallel redundancy-allocation problem has been 
widely studied for hardware-oriented systems with the approaches of dynamic 
programming[9].[21] integer programming[3],[10],[[18] nonlinear optimization and 
heuristic techniques [5],[22], The software reliability allocation problem [7]is to determine 
how reliable software modules and programs must be to maximize the user's utility, subject 
to cost and technical constraints. This chapter discusses a generic software-component 
reliability-allocation problem based on several types of software-re- liability models in a 
multiple-application environment [26]. The effort is to apply reliability-growth models for 
guiding component testing based on multiple a,pplications. The solution procedure is given 
for the single application environment, for general continuous distributions [2]. The 
situation is examined where software components can interact with each other, a condition 
not considered by other studies. Also included are scenarios for fault-tolerant attributes of a 
system where some component failures can be tolerated. The reliability specification and 
solution-seeking procedure, which has been automated by a software tool, is presented as 
an innovative mechanism to handle the difflcuh, important testing-resource allocation 
problem. [5], [17], [22] 
5.1.2 Project application 
Several real projects on component-based techniques motivate this 
investigation. They are described in the following three case studies. 
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1) Distributed Software Systems: Distributed telecommunication systems often serve 
multiple application types, by executing various software components to meet various 
reliability requirements. For instance in telephone switches 1-800 calls require a 
processing reliability that is different from standard calls; similar examples exist in call 
centers, PBXs, or voice-mail systems. 
During the testing of such systems, reliability is a prime concern, and adequate test and 
resource allocation are therefore very important. The examples in this chapter make it clear 
that trustworthy reliability-growth curves can help considerably in efficient testing and 
debugging planning of such system. 
2) Fault-tolerant systems: The figure given below shows model that has been applied to 
many systems. Each layer can include several software components. Not all systems 
include all the layers. 
This chapter conjectures that error-propagation between layers occurs only in one 
direction: upwards. Thus, for example, faults not contained in the hardware can propagate 
up to the operating system or to the application software; however, faults not contained in 
the middle-ware layer can not propagate to the operating system but can propagate to the 
application software layer.[21].[3],[17] 
Error propagation occurs from layer I to layer i + 1 if layer i has no fault-tolerance 
mechanisms: it does not exhibit a fail-silent behavior. From a modeling perspective, this 
layer contributes higher failure rate to the system than a layer with error detection and 
recovery mechanisms. Error detection and recovery software can reside in some or all of 
the layers. 
This chapter shows how fault-tolerant mechanisms can be included in the problem 
formulation for reliability-specification and resource-allocation, provided that coverage 
factors are available. 
3) Object-Oriented Software: Object-oriented software often allows for a clear delineation 
between different software components. If object-oriented software methods are being 
used, the relation between components and applications can be assessed, and testing time 
can be assigned in the most efficient way. 
Another optimization problem in object-oriented software testing arises when the best 
combination of objects must be selected to make an application as reliable as possible. This 
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optimization problem is an example of a stnicture-oriented optimization problem, and can 
be solved by using different methods. The intent of this chapter is to optimize with respect 
to software development and testing, not with respect to software structure. The 
combination of structure-oriented optimization methods and the development-oriented 
methods in this chapter can provide a powerful mechanism in component-based and 
object-based software system design. [20] 
5.1.3 Chapter Organization 
Section 4.2 specifies the optimal reliability allocation as two related problems: 
> a problem with fixed target failure rate, 
> a problem with fixed debugging time. 
Section 4.3 presents the analytic solutions to these two problems for the single application 
environment. Section 4.3.1 for the exponential distribution, and Section 4.3.2 for general 
distributions. 
Section 4.4 discusses how the solutions for the problems in a multiple-application 
environment can be obtained. The results are extended to consider software-failure 
dependencies and to incorporate fault-tolerant systems. 
Section 4.5 proposes the reliability-allocation problem specification and solution procedure 
into step-by-step framework, and applies it to a case study. The systematic application of 
the reliability allocation framework is designed and applied in an automatic software tool. 
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Fig-1 Layered software architecture model. 
5.2 Problem Specification 
The project case studies in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 can be described as a general problem of 
assigning failure-rate requirements (at the time of release) to software components that will 
be used to build various applications, given that the applications have pre-specified 
reliability requirements. 
Consider the situation where a set of N software components Ci, CN, can be 
used in various combinations for various applications. 
> Let there be M such applications: Ai,..., AM. 
> Let each application have a pre-specified reliability requirement Ri(t),..., RMCO-
By investing development/testing/debugging time in components, then component failure 
rates can be made such that all applications mieet their reliability requirement. 
Therefore, the goal in reliability allocation is to assign failure-rate requirements to the N 
components, such that all the pre-specified reliability requirements of the M applications 
are satisfied, at minimal cost. The remainder of this Section 4.2 characterizes the cost in 
terms of component testing (including debugging) time. The optimization criterion thus is 
the minimization of this testing time. Reliability-growth models relate the component 
failure-rates to the amount of testing time. 
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A variation of this problem formulation arises if a fixed amount of testing time is available 
for each application. This requirement can occur because of the constraint on the cost 
incurred by the component developer and tester. In that case, "minimization of the failure 
rate of all the components is the objective of the optimization problem. These two 
variations of the optimization problem are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Fixed Failure Rate Constraint 
Testing time is assigned to components so that the application meet their reliability 
requirements, and the testing time is minimized. 
Assumptions: 
1) The failure rates of components relate to the reliability of applications through the 
exponential distribution; 
i?,(0=exp(-^,i) 
2) The testing time, D j , invested in component j decreases the failure rate Xj according to 
some reliability-growth model. 
3) Once the software components are released, their failure rates stay constant. (This is 
reasonable given that the application developer does not debug or change the component 
that is used.) 
4) Components are s independent with respect to their failure behavior. (This assumption 
might not be appropriate when software components can interact with each other, 
potentially causing additional failures.) 
The allocation problem is formulated as: The objective fiinction is: 
Minimize 
N 
subject to the constraints: 
N 
E a r,j' X J ^ S i i . j M 
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(1) 
5 ) 
(for application A, 
(J I,J = 1 If A i uses c j a i , j = 0 
Otherwise 
; ^ . > 0 ; D i v . . . , D N ^ 0 ; 5 P - M 5 M ^ 0 
For the sake of notational simplicity, the Dj aire equally "important" (costly) among the N 
components; if this is not true, then apply Wj to each Dj in the objective function. 
Because a reliability-growth curve can be very complex, the objective function is 
nonlinear; hence this is a general nonlinear programming problem. Section 4.3.1 considers 
a closed-form solution for the problem with a single application; Section 4.4.1 discusses 
the numerical solution of the general case. 
5.2.2 Fixed Testing-Budget 
Testing time is assigned to components so that each application gets assigned at most a 
specified amount, and the application reliability is maximized. Consequently, the total 
failure rate of the components is the objective function to be minimized, leading to the 
following formulation as a mathematical programming problem. The objective function 
is:[15U19] 
Minimize 
N 
(2) 
subject to the constraints: 
A' 
Z (J ,,y D J ^ d i 
J = 1 
for A i ? • - 1 v ' » M 
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As in the problem in Section 4.2.1,all variables are positive. Weight functions for the as in 
the problem in Section 4.2.1, all variables are positive. Weight functions for the Xj can be 
introduced in the objective function to reflect their impact. 
Of special interest is the single application case which corresponds to the optimization 
problem where all applications together have a budget restriction on the testing time. The 
fixed testing-budget problem is a variant of the fixed failure-rate problem, and can be 
solved by similar means. Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 discuss the single and multiple 
applications, respectively. [6] 
5.3 Solution for Single Application Environment 
When there is only one application in the system, an explicit solution of the reliability-
allocation problem can usually be found. Section 4.3.2 gives the general solution or a large 
class of reliability-growth models. To explain the solution procedure. Section 4.3.1 gives 
the solution for an exponential reliability-growth model. 
5.3.1 Exponential Reliability-Growth Model 
The exponential reliability growth model relates the Xj to the invested Dj: 
A. j = X i,0-X^'^''^>^ (3) 
Over an infinite time interval faults are found. The Xjj is a function of time, 
although it is not explicitly in the notation. For this commonly-used reliability growth 
model, the allocation problem in the single application environment is solved. 
1) Fixed Failure-Rate Constraint: This problem is formulated in the single application 
environment, assuming exponential reliability growth curves: 
Minimize 
V 1 
• log 
V A . 
(4) 
J 
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Subject to 
N 
H A ; < S 
To solve (3), one can use the Lagrange method, the optimization problem 
is equivalent to finding the minimum of? 
F(A.IV..., XJ=T) + Q 
f N N 
- 8 (5) 
The solution is: 
•k , 
v^ 
H i 
• X 1 » j=l , . . . . ,N. (6) 
The testing times allotted to the software Components follow from substituting the values 
in (6) into (4), e.g. 
D 1 
/ 
^^1 
. log 1,0 
A 
^ 1 
(7) 
Di is negative if X\ > X,i,o . To assure that no impossible solutions arise, Section 4.3.2 
presents a procedure that checks for validity conditions and guarantees that the optimal 
solution follows a valid strategy. 
Example I: The system has 3 components, Ci,C2,C3, and 1 application A which uses all the 
components X,i,o - X,2,o= hfi -S/ye&r. The application requirement states that 5 - 6/year,ni 
=^2 =^3 =1. Then Xi= A-2= ,^3 =2/year and Di = D2= D3 = log(2.5). Thus, when the initial 
failure rates and the rate of reduction in failure rates with debugging is the same for all the 
components, then an average testing policy, where all the component failure rates are 
brought down to the same value, provides a solution that meets the application requirement 
with minimum testing-time; the testing-time for each component is the same. 
2) Fixed Testing Budget: The fixed-testing budget-problem can be formulated in the single 
application environment, assuming exponential reliability-growth curves, as: 
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Minimize 
A' 
X = 
Subject to the constraint 
N 
S 
j = 1 
z 
J = 1 
D 
A 
j 
(8) 
< D 
Again, this can be solved using the Lagrange method, treating the optimization problem as 
equivalent to finding the minimum of 
The solutions are 
D „)= ^ + e f N Z D J - D (9) 
A- j , 0 • L 
are equal for all j = 1,2,,.. ,,N . 
li- K- P- D JJ (10) 
D 
D 
J = 2 ^1 
Jog A. j , o • M' j 
(11) 
Equations (9)-(l 1) determine how the testing times should be allocated to the components. 
The minimum). Follows directly fi-om the values for the testing times. 
Only if the) Xjo and Hj values are independent of j , then an average testing policy where the 
available testing time is equally divided among the components, provides an optimal 
solution. If either the A^,o or p.j values are not the same for all j , then (9)-(ll) must be 
computed to obtain an optimal allocation of the testing time. 
5.3.2 General Reliability-Growth Models 
This section provides the procedure to obtain the closed-form solution for a generic 
reliability-growth model. The only restriction to the growth models is with respect to their 
first and second derivatives. The solution procedure follows directly from the solution of 
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the Lagrange method, except that impossible solutions must be prevented. It generalizes 
the procedure for the hyper-geometric to general continuous distributions. 
Consider the fixed failure-rate constraint case. Let the relation between the failure rate and 
the testing times be functions of fj. [8] 
D J = f i CX i^ (12) 
Without loss of generality, the N components can be reordered according to the absolute 
values of the derivatives at the beginning of the debugging interval, at which ^= Xj,o 
abs 
V d A- J 
f j V A j y | ^ j ~ ^ j , 0 
J 
f 
> 
vciX.j+1 
Ij+i VAJ+I / |A . J+ I ~ A.j+i,c 
\ 
Fora l I j= l ,2 , ,N-1(13) 
J 
The algorithm to obtain the closed-form solution uses this ordering (13). 
Algorithm for Closed-Form Solution 
1,K=N 
2. Forj = 1 toK 
express Xj as a function gj (Xk) for X, such that (d/d Xj) fj Xj= (d/d X^) fk Xk 
3. Find \ from XSj (^) = k 
4. If (Xk) > Xk,o Then , K = K -I, and go to step 2 
Else 
Forj = I toK 
Compute Xj from both gj (Xk) instep 3 and from the (Xk) in step 3 
End For 
End-If 
End-Algorithm 
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The important feature in this Algorithm is the ability to determine which component 
should be assigned zero testing-time if an imipossible solution 'is obtained (an impossible 
solution arises if Xj > Xj^ for some component). If the first derivatives(d/d Xj) f j X, < 0 for 
all j , and the second derivatives of f j Xj > 0 for all j , then the component ranked lowest 
according to the derivatives at time zero can be discarded. This happens in step 4 of the 
Algorithm; i.e., the sufficient conditions on the derivatives imply that: a) the failure rate 
decreases over time, and b) the rate of decrease gets smaller as time increases. If these 
conditions on the first and second derivatives do not hold, then specific conditions must be 
established to determine which components should not be assigned testing time 
The Algorithm can be similarly formulated for the fixed testing budget problem, but is not 
done here. [8] 
Pareto Growth Model: As an illustration, consider the Pareto distribution for the fixed 
failure-rate constraint problem. The failure rate is 
X,(t)=s,,o.(s... + t)"'' 
Sj,o ,8j,i ,£,,2 are constants. 
Hence 
D , = 
1 
^ As 
J ,0 
k J 
S j , i 
V A. J y 
(14) 
The Pareto class of failure-rate distributions is, usefiil because it is a generalization of the 
exponential, Wei bull, and gamma classes. The Crow model is a special case of the Pareto 
model. [23] 
The first derivative is less than 0, and the second derivative is greater than 0, if £j, o ,£j,i ,£j,2 
are all positive. Hence, using d Dj /dXj, the result is, in step 2 of the Algorithm (K = N in 
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The important feature in this Algorithm is the ability to determine which component 
should be assigned zero testing-time if an impossible solution 'is obtained (an impossible 
solution arises if X, > Xj^ for some component). If the first derivatives(d/d Xj) fj X, < 0 for 
all j , and the second derivatives of f j ^ > 0 for all j , then the component ranked lowest 
according to the derivatives at time zero can be discarded. This happens in step 4 of the 
Algorithm; i.e., the sufficient conditions on the derivatives imply that: a) the failure rate 
decreases over time, and b) the rate of decrease gets smaller as time increases. If these 
conditions on the first and second derivatives do not hold, then specific conditions must be 
established to determine which components should not be assigned testing time 
The Algorithm can be similarly formulated for the fixed testing budget problem, but is not 
done here. [8] 
Pareto Growth Model: As an illustration, consider the Pareto distribution for the fixed 
failure-rate constraint problem. The failure rate is 
^Xt)=8,o.(s..+ tr ' 
ej,o ,£),! ,£j,2 are constants. 
Hence 
D,= 
/ 
V 
S j,o 
\ 
X> 
£ i . 
S j . i 
i J 
(14) 
The Pareto class of failure-rate distributions is, usefijl because it is a generalization of the 
exponential, Wei bull, and gamma classes. The Crow model is a special case of the Pareto 
model. [23] 
The first derivative is less than 0, and the second derivative is greater than 0, if EJ, O ,£J,I ,ej.2 
are all positive. Hence, using d Dj /d\ , the result is, in step 2 of the Algorithm (K = N in 
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the first iteration) 
f - j ,2 
Sj,o 
• A.J 
^ - J - . 1 ^ 
V J 
f 
8j,2 
\ 
Sk.o'"'^ 
•A i 
e k , 2 
V J 
V £k.2 ) 
(15) 
In step 3, one must equate the total failure rate to 6; it must be done numerically, because a 
closed-form expression using the Pareto distribution 
is too intricate. As soon as a possible solution for 'K is obtained ,compute the individual 
failure rate using: 
f 
x.= 
^ 
S j .2 S k ,0 ek , 2 
V 
8 k , 2 • ^ j . z 
• X 
sk , 2 
S j ,o 
« j , 2 
-+ I 
J 
(16) 
5.4 Solutions for Multiple Application Environments 
When there are multiple applications in the system, the reliability-allocation becomes too 
intricate to solve explicitly. However, its solution can be obtained using nonlinear 
programming software such as AMPL. 
5.4.1 An Example 
An example of a 3-component, 3-application system is specified and solved. 
Example; There are Ci, C2,C3 which can be used to build Ai, A2, A3. 
> Aiis buih using Ci,C2. 
> A2 is buih using Ci ,€2 
> Asis built using Ci, C2, C3. 
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Thus, there are multiple applications, each with a failure-rate constraint. The fixed failure-
rate constraint problem is: 
Minimize: 
D = S D , (,7) 
j = 1 
Under the constraints: 
?L . + X 2 ^ 5 , (forA.) 
I 2 + X 3 ^ b 2 (forA^), 
X ^ + X 2 + X 2 ^ 5 3 (forA3). 
The fixed testing-budget problem is 
Minimize: 
N 
^ = I A y (18) 
J = I 
Und 
D 
D 
D 
er the constraints: 
, + D , < 
2 + D 3 < 
1 + D 2 + 
d 
d 
D < d 3 
use the parameters where the initial failure rates for the 3 components are the same : Xi o = 
2^,0= 3^,0 =5/year,^i = I,|i2 "^ 2,113 =3. Let the failure-rate requirements for the 3 
applications be 5i= 6,82= 5,83 -7. 
Model this as a nonlinear optimization problem with multiple constraints in AMPL, and 
use the MINOS solver; the result is; Xi = 3.818,X2= 1.909,^3=1.207 years. The total testing-
time for this failure-rate allocation is 1.207 years; (the individual testing times can be 
computed using the failure-rate allocation for each component). The failure-rate constraint 
for A3 is strictly satisfied. For Ai with the failure-rate requirement of 6/year, it is not 
strictly satisfied (Xi +%2= 5.73); similarly for A2 with the failure-rate 
requirement of 5/year (X2+ ^3= 3.18). 
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Consider an average testing policy where the constraint for A3 is strictly satisfied without 
violating the other constraints: X\ - 2.333,7^ = 2.333, X3 =2.333. The total testing-time 
Based on this average testing policy is 1.39 years, much larger than that obtained with the 
optimal testing policy.[24] 
5.4.2 Software-Failure Dependencies and Fault- Tolerant Systems 
The basic reliability-allocation problem formulation can be extended in various ways. Two 
extensions are discussed, software-failure dependencies and fault-tolerance aspects. 
Section 4.4.1 assumes that software components fail independently. In reality, this might 
well not be the case. For example, the feature interaction problem describes many incidents 
where independently developed software components interact with each other 
unexpectedly, thus causing unanticipated failures. This extra failure incidence is 
incorporated by 
introducing pair-wise failure rates: X^ j represents the failure rate due to the interaction of 
Ci and Cj, i < j . These failures are caused by interactions of software components. 
Therefore, they are not detected in individual component testing, but by integration testing 
of pairwise components. These failure rates are computed by counting the numbers of 
failures involving 
pairwise components during the integration testing, and divide them by the pairwise 
components execution times spent in the integration testing. While failures involving 2 
components might not be neglectable, failures involving at least 3 components are usually 
rare. 
The constraints of the original problem are then modified as: 
N 
2 ^ CTi.j A j — Z J A i , j — Oi (forAi),i-l,2,...,M 
j -1 Q ( . , j ) 
Q (i , j ) ^ {V (i , j)|o-,.^ = l , a . , = 1 } 
Subject to the constraint (19), minimize 
D = I D ^  
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Thus the fixed testing-time problem can be obtained by adding the pair-wise failure rates in 
the failure-rate constraints and including all individual and pairwise component testing 
times in the objective function., [23] 
When the system possesses fault-tolerant attributes, introduce coverage factors into the 
original problem. Coverage is defined as the conditional probability that when a fault is 
activated in a component, it is detected and recovered without causing system failure. 
TABLE 1 system components with corresponding parameters Growth-curve, and 
applications that use the component. 
Component 
basic 
scheduling 
Call proc. 
signal I 
signal I 
Frequency 
^,0 
10 
20 
200 
200 
20 
M-j 
1 
1 
0.2 
0.5 
1 
Std. I 
In 
In 
Not in 
In 
In 
0.5 
Std. II 
In 
In 
In 
In 
In 
0.3 
1-800 I 
In 
In 
In 
In 
Not in 
0.1 
1-800 n 
In 
In 
In 
Not in 
In 
0.1 
testing -time. 
tiL 
30 
,Si 
basse / 
Rohoduling / 
call proc.;' 
Signaling f 
./ 
,.-'7 
/ -
/ 
..'*" 
J ...f^^-^"" 
....--." •*'*'-^  
8 16 32 64 
Tc'a.' '^esMng Time 
128 256 
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Reformulate the fixed failure-rate constraint case, using pj = 1 -Cj, as: 
Minimize 
subject to 
D = I D 
N 
^ ^ i j P j ' ^ ^ J — O i (for Ai) ,1=1,2,..., M 
j = l 
Fault-tolerant attributes are usually provided by external system-components. The 
coverage factors are determined by the design features of these components, which is 
independent of how well the target components Cj are tested.[12] 
5.5 Reliability Allocation Solution Framework 
Reliability allocation has been discussed in terms of two constraints: fixed failure rates or 
fixed testing budgets. The problem of accounting for component interactions also has been 
discussed. The fault-tolerant attributes in the system to tolerate component failures are also 
incorporated. This section formulates a fi-amework for specifying and solving a general 
reliability-allocation problem, and applies this framework to a specific application. A tool 
to automate the procedure is described. 
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Fig-3 Optimal testing time allocation for all components vs. ^ in growth curve of the 
scheduling software. 
5.5.1 A Problem Specification and Solution Procedure 
The following procedure specifies the reliability allocation problem, and obtains solutions 
either analytically or using numerical methods. 
Procedure 
1) determine if the problem is a fixed failure rate constraint or a fixed testing budget. 
2) Determine if there is single application or multiple applications in the system. 
3) Set the constraints on the failure rates or testing bud- gets. 
4) Obtain parameters of the reliability growth curves of the components. 
5) Determine if the components interact. If so, obtain pair-wise failure rates. 
6) Determine if there are fault-tolerance features in the system. If so, obtain coverage 
measures for each component. 
7) Format the problem as a nonlinear programming problem with appropriate parameters. 
8) If the solution is analytically available, obtain it. Otherwise, use mathematical 
programming tools and solvers to obtain the results. 
End-:. Procedure 
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Section 5.1 2 examines a case study where a required reliability-allocation problem is 
specified: It applies the procedure in Section 5 .A to the project to obtain numerical 
solutions for various scenarios. 
5.5.2. Hypothetical Example 
Consider a distributed software architecture used for switching telephone calls. Different 
call-types exercise different software-modules; the system is split into components such 
that reliability-growth models are available for all components. A prerequisite to this 
analysis is the availability of reliability-growth models, and this example clearly shows 
that it is beneficial to make decisions based on such models. 
Table 1 show the data input in this example. Neither the example nor the data correspond 
to existing systems or numbers. Consider 4 types of calls (2 types of standard calls, and 2 
types of 1-800 calls), and 5 components (basic processing, scheduling, call processing, and 
2 signal-processing modules). The terms "in" and "not in" in Table 1 denote which 
components are used by the applications; e.g., the standard calls of type 1 use all software 
modules except the call-processing module. The reliability-growth curves for the 
components are exponential, and have parameters |i and \ as specified in Table 1. [8] 
The results of this example show two things: 
> the necessity to use mathematical optimization techniques to establish an optimal 
allocation scheme, 
> The importance of selecting and parameter zing adequate reliability-growth models. 
Fig. 2 depicts, with a given total amount of testing-time available (x-axis), the time 
allocated to test individual components (y-axis). Following the framework in Section 4.5.1 
it was solved as a fixed testing budget problem with multiple applications. Assume, 
however, that the testing time is shared by all applications: consider the special case in 
Section 4.2.2 where the constraints map to a single constraint. Applications are weighted, 
based on 
Their relative frequency of occurrence (in Table I), which can be automatically converted 
to weights on the component failure rates in the objective flinction. Using relative 
frequencies for various call applications parts of the operational profile are included in the 
model. Solutions were obtained for the testing-time ranging from 2 to 256, assuming no 
failure dependency or explicit fault-tolerance mechanisms. 
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Fig. 2 shows very clearly the dependence of the optimal schedule on the total testing-time. 
For example, while the scheduling component should not be assigned debugging time if 
the available budget is small, it takes the largest chunk if the testing budget is large. The 
irregular assignment of testing-time to individual components in Fig. 2 cannot be obtained 
easily by means other than mathematical modeling. Without a systematic approach such as 
in this chapter, one could not expect to get such precise results, and would be forced to 
make inefficient decisions. 
Fig. 3 plots changes of the allocation of testing-time to the components, while 11 of the 
reliability-growth curve for the scheduling software varies fi-om 0.001 to 100. In this case, 
the allowed failure rates per application were taken to be 4, and the fixed failure-rate 
constraint problem was solved. 
The parameter value greatly influences the optimal solution. If the decay parameter of the 
reliability-growth model of the scheduling component is small, then it takes enormous 
investments in debugging time to reach the desired failure rates. If the decay parameter is 
relatively large, then it takes minor effort for the scheduling component to obey the failure 
rate restrictions. 
The s-correlation between the optimal testing-time and the parameters of the reliability-
growth curve shows the importance of data collection to establish trustworthy growth 
models. Without such models, decisions about reliability allocation will be suboptimal. 
5.5.3 RAT: The Reliability Allocation Tool 
A reliability allocation tool (RAT) was designed and built with a GUI (graphical user 
interface) based on a Java Applet. The tool allows: a) multiple applications to be specified, 
and b) optimizations to be performed both under the fixed failure-rate and fixed testing-
budget constraints. The user inputs the model using the GUI. and the input is converted 
into AMPL files and is solved using the MEMOS solver, called by AMPL. Fig. 4 shows the 
GUI. The tool chooses the optimization criteria, where optimizing the failure-rate implies 
that the constraint is the fixed testing budget, and "opfimizing testing fime" implies that the 
constraint is a fixed failure rate. Components can be specified in the "Components" field, 
and applications can be specified in the "Applications" field. The reliability-growth 
distribution can be chosen for each component independently; parameters for these 
distributions can be specified in the "Parameters" box. At present, exponential and Pareto 
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distributions are allowed, but we plan to extend the options to specifying other 
distributions. For a fixed failure-rate constraint, the allowed failure-rate for the applications 
can be specified in the "Allowed Failure Rate" field; similarly, if testing time is fixed, then 
it can be specified in the "Allowed Debugging Time" field. Information about the 
components that have been specified and the applications that have been input are shown 
in two separate areas. When the model is solved, it produces results in the "Message" field, 
[22] 
The major computational effort required for the RAT tool is on the MINOS solver. For the 
5-component system in section 4.5.2, it takes about a few million seconds to obtain the 
result in a Sun Ultra workstation. As the time requirement increases only linearly with the 
number of components in the system (not including pair-wise failure rates and fault-
tolerant attributes), the performance of the RAT tool is quite acceptable. [21] 
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